Free Choice and Many Welcomes. Ukrainian Refugees in the EU and beyond
August 2025

Dietrich Thränhardt

to appear in: Yves CHARBIT, Eugenia GOMEZ DEL RIO, James F. HOLLIFIED, Sascha KRANNICH eds., DROITS DE L'HOMME ET MIGRATIONS INTERNATIONALES MIGRATIONS, Volume II, VULNERABILITE ET DROITS DE L'HOMME EN SITUATION DE MOBILITE, edited in English and in French.

Abstract

One week after the Russian aggression in February 2022, the EU activated Temporary Protection (TP) for displaced Ukrainians. They can free to choose their country of refuge and enjoy work and welfare rights. Civil society supported and hosted millions of refugees, as state reception institutions were overwhelmed. TP with free choice is a grand life experiment that challenges long-standing perceptions based on the malfunctioning European and American asylum systems. Under TP, states cooperate, instead of trying to funnel refugees elsewhere. Legal disputes are largely absent whereas they consume much energy and resources under the asylum regime. Civil society engages actively, instead of working against bureaucratic hurdles under the asylum regime. The agency of the refugees can unfold, instead of being wasted at borders, restrictions and long waiting times.

A stable East-West settlement pattern has emerged. In May 2025, 3.4 percent of the Czech population are Ukrainian refugees. Poland follows with 2.7 percent and, Estonia, with 2.5 percent. France has the lowest proportion with 0.1 percent. Eastern EU countries let the refugees choose their place of living, recognized their qualifications and expect them to take up work after being supported for some months. West European countries offer higher and longer welfare payments but are hesitant and slow with credentials and more deterministic in allocating places of living. The more the refugees have agency and are recognized, the more they can contribute to their new home countries.

Free choice is a great experiment, emerging by chance in a historic challenge. We describe it in its many varieties over Europe, comparing with the given asylum system. For theory building in migration studies, it provides facts and contexts that can help us understand how open societies can successfully cooperate.

1. Free Choice over Europe: A Decision under War Pressure

Responding to the spontaneous flight of Ukrainian women and children after the brutal Russian invasion, the EU activated their Temporary Protection (TP) scheme and let the displaced people freely choose their country of refuge. "The sheer need for pragmatic solutions in the face of more than a million entries made possible what would have been a political taboo only two weeks ago. NGIs had occasionally dreamt of "free choice" as an alternative to the abhorred Dublin system, but few would have thought that it might ever be realized." (Thym 2022). It was a special moment and a historic chance to open up.

“Free Choice” was meant to cope with the crisis. under the shock of the war and the feeling of solidarity with the victims. It was a pragmatic reaction to the impossibility to apply the highly bureaucratized asylum system with its long waiting times to the sudden inflow of millions of people with visa-free status. War refugees from Ukraine got the right to work, for social support and medical care. Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Denmark (suspending its opt-out status for once) joined in and issued similar regulations. Two weeks after the EU decision, even the reluctant post-Brexit UK government announced sponsorship and family programmes, embarrassed that small neighbour Ireland hosted more refugees than the UK (Thränhardt 2023, 14-15). Canada and the USA introduced their own parallel temporary programmes.
In this article, we study how Europe hosted this largest flight in Europe since 1945/46, which countries were the main recipients, how civil society and states interacted, and if and how the refugees’ agency could unfold. And we ask how the outcomes of a free choice regime compare to those of the carefully organized European asylum regime (Zaun 2017). Since refugee research has focused on the traditional asylum regime and its challenges in 2025/16 and has largely neglected the Ukrainian flight, we think that this analysis is also relevant theoretically. Should free choice last? Is it a deviation from necessary border controls or can it become a model for other refuge groups and reception environments?

2. People’s Agency and Welcome

Governments were overwhelmed by the largest mass flight in Europe since 1945/46, but civil society stepped in. Sympathizing with the victims of the brutal Russian invasion, people all over Europe offered food, clothing, and money, and many invited refugees to live with them in their houses. A Polish activist recalls: ‘It just happened…My phone has been ringing off the hook. People told me about free flats, cars for transportation, people collecting clothes… Loads of people were willing to provide accommodation and they’re still with us’ (Blaszkiewicz 2022). Village communities from Bavaria to Normandy did up empty houses so they could take in Ukrainian families (Piechulek 2022; actu.fr 2022). The Benelux monarchs each opened one of their palaces for refugees (Thränhardt 2023, 20). Volunteers from many countries went to the Ukrainian border to bring aid and pick up refugees. Ukrainians already living in the EU were particularly active and served as contacts, intermediaries, sources of information, translators and hosts. European railways offered free rides (Thränhardt 2023, 11).

Digital assistance networks sprang up spontaneously, connecting refugees and hosts, and helping Ukrainians to “become embedded”, as Lukas Kunert, co-founder of *#UNTERKUNFTUKRAINE* in Germany, expressed it. Founded after the war broke out, his initiative matched 49,000 refugees with private hosts in 2022, out of 400,000 offers (Haller et al. 2022). The great majority of these hosts had no previous experience with asylum issues and acted spontaneously, without ideological motives (Haller et al. 2022: 20). The German government referred to this initiative, instead of organizing linkages itself. In Switzerland, the Swiss Refugee Council organised distribution and worked closely with the state. However, two-thirds found homes informally, outside this framework (Bauer 2022). In Italy, the state planned for 100,000 war refugees, but only 14,000 places were made available. Most refugees found their first refuge by private initiative, often by Ukrainians already living in Italy (INFO Migrants 2022b). Denmark announced the building of ‘Ukrainian towns’ (Gillet 2022) but failed to follow through, not least because far fewer than the expected

100,000 refugees arrived. In France the state organized the mediation, but France became the country with the lowest intake per capita (see below).

For Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia, UNHCR estimated that 32 per cent of war refugees lived with private hosts, 34 per cent in rented accommodation and 28 per cent in collective accommodation or transit centres of various kinds (UNHCR Factsheet 2022). Poland and other border countries had only minimal official reception structures, due to low refugee numbers before. Poland's large cities became centres of activity, using football stadiums and other facilities to serve the refugees in the first days and weeks. In most countries, private initiative prevailed, and states relied on it. The Netherlands were the exception; they activated disaster legislation and gave mayors full powers to procure or requisition properties. Thus, they were able to accommodate four-fifths of the refugees on boats, at holiday resorts or other places. Quite to the contrary, Britain relied totally on private initiative and issued visas only on condition of an invitation by families or private hosts.

We do not have Europe-wide statistics on civil society initiatives, but it is evident that this was the moment of civil society in its digital age, in contrast to the build-up of governmental structures for the refugees of 2015/16.

3. Work and qualification recognition in Eastern EU Countries

On April 5, 2022, the European Commission "encourage(d) Member States to ensure that professionals enjoying temporary protection … can access jobs that correspond to their qualification level by relying on an efficient, rapid and well-functioning system of recognition of their professional qualifications. In this context, Member States should take measures to estimate the expected number of incoming professionals to ensure they have sufficient capacity to process applications for recognition" after the "rapid inflow" of four million Ukrainians, "many of whom may be well-qualified". The Commission pointed to the "high and increasing demand for healthcare professionals", "Ukrainian speaking teachers" and other professions. It envisaged a chance that refugees could "help to address" shortages at the labour market. Work inclusion should be "quick, fair, transparent and affordable", to "ensure that people are smoothly integrated into the host countries" (European Commission 2022).

Even before, Poland passed a special law in March 2022 to entitle displaced Ukrainians to work as "doctors and dentists, nurses and midwives, psychologists, academic teachers and researchers, school teachers' assistants if they know the Polish language, miners, persons working in public offices, and persons working in the foster care system (upon the consent of specified authorities" (UNHCR 2023). The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic states acted likewise. Estonia and Czechia recruited Ukrainian teachers, Estonia established bilingual Ukrainian Estonian schools. Moreover, many startups and other businesses were founded by refugees, particularly in Poland. (Lewandowsky et al. 2024).

In Poland, Estonia and Czechia, about two thirds of the Ukrainian refugees had taken up work in autumn 2022, and a substantial percentage was working in their learned professions. As a result, Ukrainian refugees paid taxes, and the countries benefitted. For 2023, Deloitte calculated that Poland received around one percent more taxes due to the refugees, by far offsetting the spending for refugees from 2023 on. Ukrainian manpower contributed to the growing Polish economy and eased bottle necks, even when the war had negative implications and the country invested heavily

in defence (Zymnin et al. 2023). “Additional government tax revenues trump the costs of refugee-connected expenditure. A larger wage pool, higher private consume and influx of capital from abroad result in larger tax revenue.” (Deloitte/UNHCR 2024). In a follow-up study, Deloitte assessed that “as Ukrainian refugees entered the labour market, the economy adapted, resulting in more specialization and higher productivity”. Wages rose for natives as well as immigrants. Deloitte calculated a positive net impact of 2.7% for the Polish GDP because of the Ukrainian refugee participation. Challenges remained with respect to over-qualification, lack of fluent Polish and with older refugees. In 2024, 69 percent of Ukrainian refugees were employed (Deloitte/UNHCR 2025).

In the Czech Republic, 76 % of the Ukrainian refugees were employed in 2024, mostly in manufacturing, hospitality, construction and other services. Five percent worked in health care, and 20 % of households received humanitarian benefits from the Czech government, compared to 38 % in 2023. The median household income stood at 933 Euros (UNHCR 2025) which is 91 % of the general household income in Czechia. In Estonia, 71 Percent of males and 65 percent of females were employed. The income level of Ukrainian refugees stood at 64 % of the general income level in 31 May 2025, despite largely similar incomes in most sectors and because of but high percentage of Ukrainians working in elementary occupations (Statistics Estonia 2025).

Ukrainians were free to choose their place of living and preferred the boom regions around Warsaw and Wroclaw where work was easy to find (Norodowy Bank Polski 2023, 39). Likewise, Ukrainians clustered around Estonia’s capital Tallinn and the boom regions in Czechia.

4. De-Qualification and Welfare Dependency in Western EU Countries

In contrast, West European countries did not follow the Commission’s recommendation. “The majority of Member States … apply the general national rules to the recognition of qualifications and diplomas for displaced persons from Ukraine. No specific rules for the recognition of diplomas and qualification of displaced persons from Ukraine have been enacted in the EFTA States.“ (European Labour Authority 2024).

Ukrainians in West European countries work largely in non-qualified jobs or remain unemployed (EMN/ OECD 2024). Italy’s early opening of the health sector in March 2022 is the exception (Decreto Legge 21 Marzo 2022), another is the timely recruitment of teachers in the German state of Saxony (Thränhardt 2024, 20). In many countries’, we find preference rules for EU/Efta professionals and for “best friends” like Canada, Australia and the U.S.A, but there is no endeavour to extend preference towards Ukrainians. Even in post-Brexit Britain, preference rules for EU doctors were extended but no preferences for Ukrainians were set up. Emotional solidarity statements, particularly just after the Russian invasion, stand in sharp contrast to the bureaucratic immobility when it comes to practical steps for recognition. Blunt refusal of recognition or endless waiting discourage the applicants (Thränhardt 2024, 23-33) and restrict them to undesirable jobs. “Clearly, you can simply put psychologists to cleaning toilets,” commented a frustrated Ukrainian psychologists’ initiative when they were refused recognition and could not serve their needy fellow Ukrainians in Switzerland (Bäni 2024a, translated).

A Swiss study of the “labour market integration of female refugees from Ukraine” concludes that “the specific needs of those seeking protection seemed less decisive than existing institutional arrangements (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2025, summary, translated). A multitude of cantonal and federal regulations make it difficult to find work, and mandatory work permits are often delayed so that it was easier for business to hire other workers, for example EU citizens. Ukrainian focus group members complained that they „had few rights and many obligations and were subject to many controls” (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2025, 29, translated). The richest countries like Switzerland and Norway seem particularly uninterested or unable to provide easy ways for the displaced Ukrainians. The have easy access to the large European labour market, e. g. to German medical staff, in contrast to the Eastern EU countries which have been the source of inner-European labour migration since 1990.

In Switzerland as well as in Germany and in Austria, we find over-organized labour and integration bureaucratic systems that hinder the agency of the refugees. Whereas all reports conclude that “the motivation to work is high” (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2025, summary, translated) and discourse data analysis reveals that Ukrainian in chat groups debate primarily about work possibilities[1], work participation rates are low, even after three years. The German government started a “JobTurbo”, to further the work integration of Ukrainians. (Terzenbach 2024). Switzerland copied the concept. In Germany, 33.2. per cent of Ukrainian refugees were working in March 2025, 29.7 per cent o the women and 33.2 of the men. Even more striking is the low positioning of the Ukrainians: in November 2024, 45.1 % worked unqualified as “helpers”, 38.8 % as skilled workers, and only 7. % as specialists and 8.8 % as experts. This positioning was lower than a year before, lower than that of other immigrant groups and much lower than that of the indigenous population (BA 2025; Thränhardt 2024, 10). 30 % had found work at the end of 2024 in Switzerland, and 43.9 per cent in Austria (ÖIF 2025).

In the political discourse, Ukrainians are then accused of being “arbeitsscheu” (work-shy) (Bäni 2024c), and politicians demand that influxes should be restricted, TP should be terminated, or non-working people should be sent back.

5. European Welfare Varieties

Financial support for hosts and for Ukrainian refugees varies widely around Europe and has undergone changes over time. European welfare systems are quite diverse with respect to the systems and the level of payments. A few states treat Ukrainians on par with their own citizens, some put them at lower standards, others pay monthly lump sums or one-off payments. Most West European countries grant social security permanently, whereas Eastern EU countries paid welfare payments only for some months, except for needy and old people and for children. They expected able-bodied refugees to look for work. Payments were rather low in Poland and expired on June 30, 2022. Estonia had extra payments for refugee children, higher than for Estonian children, to get them started.

[1] Analysis of 248 chat groups with 182.526 users between November 2022 and May 2024. Up to April 2023, document problems had been the prime issue. Unpublished, Minor Projektkontor, Berlin.

British hosts got a lump sum of 350 pounds a month, and 500 pounds after a year, irrespective of the number of people they took in. Ireland paid its hosts 400 Euros and doubled to 800 Euros in autumn 2022 as an incentive, facing accommodation problems and trying to clear public accommodation, to use them for incoming refugees. Three years later, in July 2025, the subsidy was reduced to 600 Euros (Polak 2025). Norway, acting in the opposite direction, ended payments for people in private homes in 2024, pushing them to move into state accommodation. The Netherlands began with a high lump sum plus freedom to work and earn on top but later treated Ukrainians on par with other refugees. Germany put Ukrainians into its social security system on equal terms with citizens on June 1, 2022, elevated into *Bürgergeld* (citizen's allowance) on January 1, 2023. In addition, they get housing benefits. Austria included Ukrainians in its low *Grundversorgung* (basic care) on par with asylum applicants, with the effect that they would remain at this low level permanently. Switzerland's payments vary widely between cantons or even municipalities, even when the central refugee authority tried to distribute Ukrainians around the country. The Swiss canton Bern has the highest payment in Europe, with 696 Swiss francs for a single person, and 382 francs if she lives in a public institution. (Bäni 2024c). Other cantons pay less than half of this sum and it is difficult to survive on such payments. Hartmann/ Montani 2022).

In West European countries, welfare payments and low employment figures became an issue. Germany's finance minister complained about six billion Euros *Bürgergeld* for the Ukrainians in 2023. In September 2023, the German government started the "JobTurbo", to speed up the process of bringing Ukrainians into work, after they had at first promoted a "language first" approach, making the standard 35-week integration courses compulsory and in effect reducing the work participation rate of Ukrainian women in summer 2022. Since the course capacities were not sufficient for about 700,000 adult Ukrainians, long waiting times held them in limbo and accustomed them to *Bürgergeld.* Course efficiency was low, many did not pass the tests, and the standard course did not qualify as professional work language. A journalistic investigation found out that 1674 Ukrainian doctors had applied for recognition up to July 2024 but only 187 applications had been decided (Thränhardt 2024, 18). Since the process is complicated, costly and lengthy, many do not apply.

The Scandinavian countries "channelled Ukrainians through the regular asylum system. They formally had to apply for protection, although the collective protection simplified the procedure." (Hernes/ Danielsen 2024, p.8). Allowances differ strikingly. Denmark treats Ukrainians like recognized refugees, means tested, and 35-50 percent lower than citizens. Sweden treats them like asylum seekers, higher during integration courses, lower afterwards, and always lower than citizens. Sweden offers only emergency care to adult persons, effecting Ukrainians to move back to Ukraine or elsewhere in case of other treatments. This is clearly in breach of TP rules. Finland starts with asylum seeker allowances and moves up to payments on par with citizens after a year. Norway pays on par with citizens, and even higher during integration courses (Hernes/ Danielsen 2024).

These differences led many Ukrainians to choose Norway and few went to Sweden, different from the first months. Welfare expenditures rose, and public discussion began. In September 2024 and July 2025, Norway and Switzerland, the two richest countries in Europe, limited the reception of Ukrainian refugees to Ukraine's eastern

and central regions and declared Ukraine's western regions safe (Government.No 2024; Servettaz 2025; Meier 2025). They were free to do so since they are not EU members. Both countries had channelled Ukrainians through elaborate integration systems resulting in very low work participation rates. In addition, Switzerland introduced a screening process for Ukrainian newcomers to check how they had travelled. In 2024, this led to long waiting times and delayed integration (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2025, 10), reminding of asylum control practices and problems that should have avoided by the special temporary regime. People smuggled through Russia from the devastated city Mariupol reported that the Swiss authority asked for travel and bank documents, grotesquely misunderstanding the flight and war situation under Russian control (Bäni 2024).

6. Where Did They Go? And Why?

High-income countries are not the main recipients of the Ukrainian flight. Predictions that nearly everybody “would move to Berlin and Vienna” (European Stability Initiative 2022, translated) did not come true. Many Ukrainians went to countries bordering Ukraine but from the beginning some moved on to other countries, as far as Portugal and even Iceland. The refugees are not concentrated in a few countries as in 2015, but they found refuge all over Europe. Distribution is uneven but less so than in 2015.

Half a year after the beginning of the flight, a stable East-West settlement pattern had emerged, and it holds until today. After the initial settlement, only seven per cent have changed countries (EUAA 2024; see also Joop.et al 2023, p 32). At the end of May 2025, the Czech Republic had the densest concentration of Ukrainians, with 3.4 percent of the country’s population, followed by Poland with 2.7 percent and Estonia with 2.5 per cent. As we have discussed above, these countries have recognized Ukrainian qualifications and were particularly successful in integrating Ukrainians into their workforce already in 2022. If we look more closely, the refugees prefer the dynamic parts of these countries, such as the areas around Prague, Warsaw, Wroclaw and Tallinn, in contrast to less developed regions. With recognized professional certificates, the status of the displaced Ukrainians resembles those of EU citizens in the Eastern EU countries, including the requirement to earn an income. A further step is the Polish policy to offer transitions to work statuses. Hungary is the exception among the border countries, with a policy and practice that does not encourage Ukrainian settlement, to put it mildly.

Canada and the United States took five per cent of the fleeing Ukrainians. Canada granted 962,464 visas under its “Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) program but less than a third, 298.118 applicants used it in the until the end of the program at April 1, 2024 (Government of Canada 2025). Apparently, leaving Europe seems to be a more definitive decision to part Ukraine than staying in Europe. The USA admitted abut 270.000 Ukrainians, mainly under the “United for Ukraine” programme. After some contrarian news, it has now been extended until October 19, 2026 (US Citizenship and Immigration Service 2025).

In Western Europe, the percentages of Ukrainian refugees in the population vary from Ireland’s 2,00 percent in 2024 to 0.09 percent in France. Thus, one in thirty inhabitants of the Czech Republic is a Ukrainian refugee, but only one in one

thousand in France. Even when France pays a single displaced Ukrainian 426 Euros per month without a time limit (Ministère de L'Intérieur 2023), many prefer Czechia, Poland or the Baltic states where welfare payments are limited to a few months, but it is easier for people to work gainfully. As an enterprising Ukrainian woman, founder of three hair salons in Poland, told a German television reporter: "I could go to Germany and live from social security. But I like it more how it works in Poland." (PlusMinus 2025, translated).

Work opportunities were the prime answer when the EU Agency for Asylum asked Ukrainians for their choice of the country to settle. Only elderly people had other priorities (table 1). Education and family/ friends followed, and access to support was considered less important. These answers match the factual distribution that is reported month by month by Eurostat and UNHCR.

Table1: What are the most important factors for you choosing your preferred destination country?

Answers	**Age 18-44**	**Age 45-64**	**Age 65+**
Work opportunities	58.6 %	44.1 %	9.9 %
Education for child	39.1 %	30.1 %	6.1 %
Family/ friends there	36.8 %	38.9 %	55.5 %
Access to support	29.6 %	30.6 %	32.9 %
Study opportunities	29.2 %	18.0 %	1.3 %
Language spoken	29.1 %	20.0 %	15.2 %
Proximity to Ukraine	23.8 %	23.0 %	23.8 %
Meat health needs	15.7 %	16.5 %	17.8 %
Past experience	12.4 %	12.6 %	7.2 %

Source: EEUA, Survey with Migrants Arriving from Ukraine. Data collected between Feb. 2023 and Nov. 2024, E-Mail communication 29 April 2025. Multiple answers possible. The answers safety (56,6/50,6/38,5) and visa requirements (10.0/ 6,2/ 3,5) were left out in the table, since they should not differ between EU+ countries.

After work opportunities that are clearly the prime attracting element, welfare levels play an important secondary role. Among West European countries, those with high welfare levels are the ones who have more than one per cent Ukrainian immigrants among their population: Ireland, Norway, Germany and Finland. Whereas full economic integration led to stability, countries with low work rates and high welfare expenditures got into discussions about modifying the terms of reception. Ireland reduced its welfare rates drastically, first for newcomers and later for all Ukrainians, from 232 to 38.80 Euros per week. Further restrictions were also introduced, including the permission for bringing dogs. Consequently, Ukrainians moved out, and the percentage dropped from 2. 0 % of the population to 1.5 % (Irish Statistics Office 2025; McGreevy 2025).

Germany hosts more than one million Ukrainians, Poland 950,000, and Czechia 350,000. Poland, Estonia, Ireland, Denmark and other states use digital systems to register the displaced people and their characteristics like age, place of living and work on a day-by-day basis. In Germany, Austria and Italy, the data situation is cumbersome, due to data protection regulations and complex responsibilities. All countries report that substantial numbers have returned to Ukraine, due to the open borders. In Germany, 23,2 percent of registered Ukrainian refugees had left the country up to June 30, 2024 (Siegert 2025). In Ireland, 29 per cent of registered Ukrainian refugees had left the country by February 2025 (Mc Greevy 2025). They can come again if need arises, other than other refugees that would not have that chance, stand at closed borders and therefore tend to stay because of fear of losing their residence rights.[2]

7. What can we learn?

Our overview shows that TP/free choice brought de- bureaucratization and freedom for citizens' and migrants' agency, and had important beneficial effects compared to the traditional asylum system (Doomernik/ van Heelsum.2024). Fears of chaos and undue concentration did not come true. On the contrary, a stable pattern of settlement came into being, directed towards work chances. Border controls were easy at EU's external borders and absent at the inner borders. There is no smuggling industry, and no build-up of administrative control apparatus. Large camps and long waiting times are absent, litigation is minimal. Civil society can work with government and does not need to go against restrictive regulations. The spiralling evils, high costs, frustrations and counterproductivities associated with the European asylum system were largely avoided. Secondary movements were few, and did not pose problems, as refugees moved where they wanted (Kohlenberger et al. 2022). As Ukrainians can return, there is no closure effect of people fearing to lose their status. European countries cooperate and hold their borders open, instead of trying to push people to other countries in the Dublin system. TP/free choice works best where it is administrated easily, digitally and effectively, and countries can then gain economically. In some of the richest countries, the positive effects are less visible, as elements of the old asylum system have been introduced, hindering the refugee's agency and hurting the labour markets. Eastern EU countries have seized the opportunity to let Ukrainian refugees work and contribute to the countries' common interest, thus creating stable foundations for integration.

For migrations theory, the experience of European welcomes für the Ukrainians with its many varieties is an interesting study field. It allows to leave the logics of control policies behind. And it can start a discussion how the policies for other refugee groups can learn from the Ukraine experience, either by setting free whole groups or by reducing controls and open more agency for citizens and refugees.

---

[2] Eurostat and UNHCR publish monthly statistics based on national reports. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Germany corrected their figures grossly because people who had returned to Ukraine or gone to other countries had remained in the statistics. If we follow Irish press reports, this also overdue in Ireland. In the public, there is often confusion about the number of Ukrainians that have registered since March 2022 and the number of those who are actually staying. For the German data see Thränhardt 2024, 7-8, and Düvell 2024.

References

actu.fr. 2022: Accueil de réfugiés ukrainiens: une première famille est arrivée à Cambremer, 30.4.2022, https://actu.fr/normandie/cambremer_ 14126/accueil-de-refugies-ukrainiens-une-premiere-famille-estarrivee-a-cambremer_50586951.html.

BA (2025). „Migrationsmonitor“. Tabelle 2.6: Zeitreihe sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigte ohne Auszubildende (6 Monatewert) nach Staatsangehörigkeit und Anforderungsniveau der ausgeübten Tätigkeit. https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/SiteGlobals/Forms/Suche/Einzelheftsuche_Formular.html?nn=1900134&topic_f=migrationsmonitor.

Bäni, R. (2024). Ukrainerinnen bangen um Status S. «Ich habe Angst, dass mich die Schweiz wegweist», https://www.blick.ch/politik/ukrainerin-bangt-um-status-s-ich-habe-angst-dass-mich-die-schweiz-wegweist-id20345618.html

Bäni, R. (2024a). https://www.blick.ch/schweiz/ukrainische-psychologin-ist-enttaeuscht-sie-darf-nicht-arbeiten-id20240701.html

Bäni, R. (2024c) https://www.blick.ch/politik/kuerzung-der-sozialhilfe-bundesrat-will-arbeitsscheue-ukrainer-bestrafen-id20260251.html

Bauer, Janina 2022: Wie eine Ukrainerin die Schweiz erlebt: ‘Sie meinte, ich soll nachts einfach Ohropax reinmachen’, https://www.blick.ch/schweiz/wie-eine-ukrainerin-die-schweiz-erlebt-sie-meinte-ich-soll-nachts-einfach-ohropax-reinmachen-17510218.htm

Blaszkiewicz, P. (2022). Anna Lamers: Ich möchte wirklich, dass die Polen lernen, dass ein Flüchtling kein Albtraum ist, https://torun.wyborcza.pl/torun/7,48723,29211790,anna-lamers-bardzo-chce-by-polacy-nauczyli-sie-ze-uchodzca.html?_ga=2.233074206.1266663536.1669901276-1257777039.1645706825&disableRedirects=true#S.najnowsze-K.C-B.1-L.2.zw (

Carrera, S., Ineli-Ciger, M. (2023). EU responses to the large-scale refugee displacement from Ukraine: An analysis on the temporary protection directive and its implications for the future EU asylum policy. Fiesole: EUI. Retrieved 15 March 2023. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/75377?fbclid=IwAR2S37j6AkZfOmyC3FjpGpKeQ6kX4WkLvE647kI4Fa2S2FzJ7pPJbAJYve0

ECRE (2024). AIDA Temporary Protection Compilation on 2023, https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Compilation-temporary-protection-2023-update.pdf

Efionayi-Mäder, D., Ruedin, D., Mandelbaum, S., Bobokova, J., D’Amato, G. (2025). Berufsintegration geflüchteter Frauen aus der Ukraine. Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO, Bern.

European Commission 2(022). Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/554 of 5 April 2022 on the recognition of qualifications for people fleeing Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Document 32022H0554

Central Statistics Office Ireland (2025). https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/fp/p-aui/arrivalsfromukraineinirelandseries16/

Danielsen, Å., Hernes, V., Tvedt, K., Staver, A. (2023). Sweden country report. Governance and policy changes during times of high influxes of protection seekers, 2015-June2023, NIBR Working Paper, 20232023.file:///C:/Users/dthra/Downloads/2023-114Sweden.pdf

DECRETO-LEGGE 21 m(arzo 2022), n. 21. Misure urgenti per contrastare gli effetti economici e umanitari della crisi ucraina, https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/03/21/22G00032/S

Deloiite/UNHCR (2024). Poland Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland – March 2024 (2).pdf

Deloiite/UNHCR (2025). Document - Poland: Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland — 2nd edition (June 2025)

Doomernik, J., van Heelsum, A. (2024). The Poor Integration Results of the Common European Asylum System Compared to the Temporary Protection Directive: The Case of the Netherlands Article Metrics | The Poor Integration Results of the Common European Asylum System Compared to the Temporary Protection Directive: The Case of the Netherlands | Journal of International Migration and Integration

Düvell, Franck (2024). „Wie viele Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine halten sich Anfang 2024 tatsächlichin Deutschland auf?". https://www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de/fileadmin/4_Publikationen/PDFs/Duvell_UkrainerInnen_in_Deutschand_Jan_2024.pdf.

Efionayi-Mäder, D., Ruedin, D., Mandelbaum, S., Bobokova, J., D'Amato, G. (2025). Berufsintegration geflüchteter Frauen aus der Ukraine». Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO, Bern

EMN/OECD (2024). "Labour market integration of beneficiaries of tempo-rary protection from Ukraine: Joint EMN-OECD inform". https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2024-05/EMN_OECD_INFORM_Labour%20market%20integra-tion_2024.pdf.

European Labour Authority (2024). report-overview-measures-people-ukraine.pdf

Gillet, K. (2022). Denmark to Build 'Ukraine Towns' to House Refugees, Says Immigration Minister, https://www.euronews, com/2022/04/08/denmark-to-build-ukraine-towns-to-house-refugees-says-immigration-minister.

Government.No 2024. The Government is changing the rules: Norway will grant collective protection to fewer Ukrainians. Press release No 86 – 2024, 27/09/2024, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/the-government-is-changing-the-rules-norway-will-grant-collective-protection-to-fewer-ukrainians/id3055194/?expand=factbox3055670.

Government of Canada (2025). Canada-Ukraine authorization for emergency travel: Key figures - Canada.ca

Haller, L.; Uhr, T; Frederiksen, S.; Rischke, R., Yanasmayan, Z., Zajak, Sa. (2022).: New Platforms for Engagements: Private accommodation of Forced Migrants from Ukraine, #UnterkunftUkraine/DEZIM, Berlin, https://2 www.dezim-institut.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Demo_FIS/publikation_pdf/FA-5396.pdf (1.2.2023)

Hartmann, L., Montani, L. (2022).Kantönligeist bei Ukrainern: So viel Sozialhilfe erhalten Flüchtlinge

Hernes, V., Danielsen, A., (2024). Reception and integration policies for displaced persons from Ukraine in the Nordic countries – a comparative analysis, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research NIBR, NIBR policy brief 2024:01https://oda.oslomet.no/oda-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/3125012/NIBR%20Ukraina%20policy%20brief%20april%202024.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Joop, A.,/ Giray Aksoy, C,. Giesing, Y., Poutvaara, P. 2024. The Effect of Conflict on Refugees' Return and Integration: Evidence from Ukraine
p 25,A Appendix Figure C4: Employment by destination country. Von tag 100 an, überwiegend stagnierend

Kohlenberger, J., Buber-Ennser, I., Pędziwiatr, K., Rengs, B., Riederer, B., Setz, I., Brzozowski, J., Nahorniuk, O. (2022). Was die hohe Selbstselektion ukrainischer Geflüchteter für ihre Aufnahmeländer bedeutet, Was die hohe Selbstselektion ukrainischer Geflüchteter für ihre Aufnahmeländer bedeutet – Netzwerk Fluchtforschung

Lewandowski, P., Górny, A., Krząkał a, M., Palczyńska M. (2024). Berufliche Herabstufung, Arbeitsaufgaben und die Rückkehrabsichten der ukrainischen Geflüchteten in Polen, **https://www.ifo.de/publikationen/2024/zeitschrift-einzelheft/ifo-schnelldienst-102024-rueckkehr-oder**-integration

Meier, D., (2025). Schweiz folgt beim Schutzstatus S wohl norwegischem Modell - News - SRF

McGreevy, R., (2025). https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2025/02/20/new-figures-suggest-almost-a-third-of-ukrainian-refugees-in-ireland-are-now-living-elsewhere/

Ministère de L'Intérieur, *Accueil et accompagnement des déplacés d'Ukraine.* (2023) https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/grands-dossiers/conflit-en-ukraine-bilan-dun-an-dengagement-du-ministere/accueil-et.

Minor (2024).. Angekommen? Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Berlin und Brandenburg. Ergebnisse einer Online-Umfrage über Arbeitssituation und Lebensbedingungen, https://minor-kontor.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Minor_ELLaB_WP_Ukraine_Umfrage_2_2024-06-12.pdf

Narodowy Bank Polski (2023). The living and economic situation of Ukrainian migrants in Poland – the impact of the pandemic and the war on the nature of migration in Poland. Report of the questionnaire survey. Department of Statistics, Warschau. https://nbp.pl/wp-content/up-loads/2023/05/Raport_Imigranci_EN.pdf.

ÖIF (2025). 3 Jahre nach Kriegsbeginn: Ukrainer/innen in Österreich : Österreichischer Integrationsfonds ÖIF

Piechulek, i. (2022). Dietfurt hilft: Pfarrhaus ist nun Unterkunft für Ukrainer, www.nordbayern.de/-1.12089179.

PlusMinus (2025). Migration und Arbeitsmarkt – Wie bekommt Deutschland mehr Geflüchtete in Arbeit? https://www.ardmediathek.de/video/plusminus/migration-und-arbeitsmarkt-wie-bekommt-deutschland-mehr-gefluechtete-in-arbeit/das-erste/Y3JpZDovL2Rhc2Vyc3RlLmRlL3BsdXNtaW51cy9hMmJkZjg4My01YWQwLTQ1OTYtYWFiMy1iZDAzOGYwMDQ4NTA

Polak, s. (2025). https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2025/07/07/changes-in-housing-support-creating-frightening-situation-for-ukrainian-families/

Radio Prague international (202). Doppelmoral: Tschechiens Umgang mit Geflüchteten, https://deutsch.radio.cz/doppelmoral-tschechiens-umgang-mit-gefluechteten-8812240

Servettaz, E. (2025), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-diplomacy/new-swiss-refugee-policy-for-ukrainians-leaves-many-questions-unanswered/88693656

Siegert, M. (2025). BAMF - Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - Forschung - Die Veränderung der Bevölkerungsstruktur ukrainischer Geflüchteter in Deutschland zwischen Ende 2022 und Mitte 2024

Statistics Estonia 2025). statsitics estonia ukraine refugees - Suchen

Sutormina, T., Stapf, T. (2024). Discussion issues in Ukrainian telegram chats in Germany, data analysis, Minor Projektkontor, power point presentation.

Stapf, T., Sutormina, T., .Wangar, A. (2024). The Role of Social Media Networks in the Labor Market Integration of Migrants and Refugees: The Example of Ukrainian Refugees in Germany In Felicitas Hillmann ed., Interdisciplinary Migration Research With a Focus on New Technologies and Multiple Crises: Relating Birds of Passage to Social Policies. Berlin Universities Publishing, p. 80-105.

Terzenbach, D. (2024). Der Job-Turbo. Erfahrungsbericht des Sonderbeauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Integration von geflüchteten Menschen in den Arbeitsmarkt, https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/datei/integration-von-gefluechteten-menschen-in-den-arbeitsmark-erfahrungsbericht_ba051201.pdf

Thränhardt, D. (2023). With open arms. The cooperative reception of Ukrainian war refugees in Europe. An alternative to the asylum regime? Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn.

Thränhardt, D. (2024). Chancen besser nutzen. Die Arbeitsbeteiligung der Schutzsuchenden aus der Ukraine, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh.

Thym, D. (2022). Temporary Protection for Ukrainians. The Unexpected Renaissance of 'Free Choice'. In *Verfassungsblog,* March 5.

US Citizenship and Immigration Service (2025). Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Ukraine | USCIS

UNHCR Factsheet 2022: Regional Protection Profiling & Monitoring Factsheet: Profiles, Needs & Intentions of Refugees from Ukraine, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97720.
Vézina, P., Giray C., Lewandowski, P. (2024). Wie Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine Unternehmensgründungen in Polen vorantreiben, https://www.ifo.de/publikationen/2024/zeitschrift-einzelheft/ifo-schnelldienst-102024-rueckkehr-oder-integration

UNHCR (2025). UNHCR_RRP_CZE chapter_2025_eng.pdf

Zaun, N. (2017) . TEU Asylum Policies. he Power of Strong Regulating Stes. Springer, Wiesbaden.

Anatoliy Zymnin, A., Kowalski, M., Brozek, S., Kowcuń, S., Dąbrowska, E., Sytnik, M., Stelmach, F., Yanovsky, Y. (2023). Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish Labour Market. New challenges and perspectives, 2023, (PDF) Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish Labour Market. New challenges and perspectives