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Inhalt

Vorwort

Dieses Heft setzt die Veröffentlichung einer Reihe von Vorträgen am IMIS fort, die sich aus unterschiedlichem Blickwinkel mit aktuellen und historischen Fragen von Migration, Integration und Minderheiten auseinandersetzen.

Dominique Schnapper diskutiert in ihrem Beitrag zwei historische Trends bei der Entstehung von Nationalstaaten, die letztlich unterschiedliche Entwicklungslinien auf dem Weg zu einer Zivilgesellschaft markieren: Sie beschreibt diese mit zivilgesellschaftlicher Nation einerseits und ethnisch bestimmter Nation andererseits. Der erste Typ wird am Beispiel von Frankreich und England erörtert, der zweite vor allem am Beispiel Deutschlands. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich in Frankreich und England die Idee der Nation in relativ stabilen Grenzen und eingebunden in zentrale staatlich-politische Strukturen herausbildete. Deutschland dagegen entwickelte seine kulturelle Identität unabhängig von der Existenz eines Nationalstaates, bestimmt durch Ideen einer ethnisch und kulturell definierten Nation. D. Schnapper verdeutlicht schließlich, daß die unterschiedlichen »Ideen der Nation« sehr konkret in den jeweiligen Einwanderungspolitiken und Regelungen zum Erwerb der Staatsbürgerschaft nachweisbar sind.

In dem Beitrag von **Panikos Panayi** wird aus historischer Sicht und an regionalen Fallbeispielen der Zusammenhang von Nationalismus bzw. Nationalstaat einerseits und der Entstehung und Lage von Minoritäten in Europa andererseits analysiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund arbeitet P. Panayi Erklärungsansätze und Definitionen zentraler Kategorien auf und grenzt verschiedene migrationsbedingte Phasen ab, welche die spezifischen geographischen und demographischen Muster von Minoritäten in Europa prägen. Er kommt zu dem Schluß, daß im modernen Europa die Exklusion von Minoritäten unvermeidlich ist, solange Nationalstaaten ohne deren zureichende politische Partizipation einseitig von den jeweiligen Majoritäten dominiert werden. Für Minoritäten sieht er die Alternative von Assimilation an die Majorität des jeweiligen Nationalstaates, um Exklusion und Ausbeutung zu umgehen, oder aber politische Organisation der eigenen Interessen.

Frank W. Carter fragt nach den internationalen und regionalen Wanderungen in ihren Ursachen und Konsequenzen vor und nach der konflikfreien Teilung der CSSR im Januar 1993 in die Tschechische und Slowakische Republik. Er konstatiert, daß die Transformationsprozesse nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regierungssystems im Jahre 1989 einen wesentlichen Einfluß auf die Migrationsbewegungen hatten. Anhand einer regional differenzierten Analyse von Sekundärdaten kommt Carter zu der Erkenntnis, daß ländliche Regionen und Schwerindustriezentren besonders von zunehmender Arbeitslosigkeit und wachsenden Abwanderungen betroffen sind, während Gebiete mit einem ausbaufähigen Dienstleistungssektor und einem Potential für Tourismus- und Erholungseinrichtungen wirtschaftlich von Zuwanderungen profitieren. Im Fall der Slowakischen Republik erkennt er eine besondere Gefahr in nationalistisch-separatistischen, fremdenfeindlichen Tendenzen, die das internationale Investitionsinteresse gefährden. Eine Kooperation mit der Europäischen Union werde in und zwischen beiden Staaten die zukünftigen Migrationsprozesse nachhaltig beeinflussen.

The Idea of Nation

By Dominique Schnapper

It is usually argued that there are two conceptions of the nation. The way they are expressed differ between countries, according to intellectual tradition and researchers' background, but the distinction remains. One definition is the civic nation, the other the ethnic nation. This dual conception pervades any discussion of the term ›nation‹.

It is this duality that I wish to question here. The opposition is both historical and ideological, but from an analytical point of view I will argue that there is only one idea of nation. Analytical thought should not consist of using words and arguments from nineteenth century ideological disputes and European international conflicts, while giving them a scholarly or obscure form. The ›pre-notions‹ of social life, to use Durkheim's words, should not be confused with analytical concepts. There have indeed been two trends in the history of the formation of the nations – the ›French‹ or ›American‹ trend and the ›German‹ one, or to use another type of vocabulary, the ›Western‹ and ›Eastern‹ ones. There have also been two types of nationalist ideologies. But one cannot deduce that there are two – analytically distinct – ideas of nation. One should resist the temptation of a manichean duality, however attractive it may at first appear.

History of Western and Eastern Europe

In Western Europe, political unity had been created long before nationalism emerged in the nineteenth century. The Kings had reunited a territory on which they exerted authority. Political union of England, later Scotland and Ireland was completed by the English monarchs. For centuries Kings have progressively united the provinces which were to form the national territory to the small kingdom of France, following military conquest and a cunning policy of marriages, exchanges and negotiations. State institutions emerged slowly from the Middle Ages onwards in France, England and Spain, prompted by the need to keep an army which imposed a heavy burden on the population. The Kings' officers levied taxes, enlisted men and requisitioned goods. The profit gained from taxes was first used

to wage war, then to enable the state to consolidate the royal territory, to centralise administrative organisation, to differentiate state control and instruments of coercion. »War made the State and the State made war.«[1] Against feudal power and popular uprisings, the Kings' civil servants, lawyers and military progressively built the state, closely related to the nation. The first manifestations of national feeling appeared in France as early as in the thirteenth century[2]; the idea of nation was born in England and France during the Hundred Years War which opposed them, and in Spain during the Catholic *Reconquista* at the end of the fifteenth century, with the deportation of Jews and Muslims in 1492 being both its instrument and symbol. The French nation-state, born out of a process stretching across centuries, existed in a monarchic form long before the nationalist idea of the peoples' right to self-determination was expressed. Monarchy was so much merged with the nation that, as Renan noticed, when France turned into a Republic, the nation remained: »This great French monarchy was so highly national that when it fell, the nation was able to stand without it.«[3] France and Britain experienced a parallel history in the birth of the idea of nation and the creation of political and state structures which, inside relatively stable borders, embodied and symbolized the unity of the nation.

The dynastic and religious entities, which were deeply interwoven, intensified each other's integrationist effects: religious unity increased royal power. Following the model of the double, human and mystical, nature of Jesus Christ, the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies created a real royal christology. By developing the fiction of a mystical Royal body distinct from but mysteriously united to the natural body of the King, the English lawyers moulded the abstract idea of a monarchy whose existence transcended the King himself. Thus the secular power asserted itself against the Church while conceiving the state as above and independent from its agents by its very nature. The King, an image of God and His instrument in the world, tended to put himself at the head of the religious organisation in his Kingdom. The King of France, who had expelled the Jews and the Protestants from his kingdom, was of divine right. The Spanish Catholic monarchs had based their political legitimacy on the religious unity of their kingdom. »The State became

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1   Charles Tilly, Reflections on the history of European state-making, in: idem (ed.), The Formation of national states in Western Europe, Princeton 1975, pp. 3–83, here p. 42.

2   Colette Beaune, Naissance de la nation France, Paris 1985.

3   Ernest Renan, Œuvres complètes, T. 1. (1882), Paris 1947, p. 894.

more and more a quasi-Church or a mystical guild on a rational basis.«[4] But at the same time, faced with the political ambitions of the Church, the King of divine right had set up and guaranteed the independence of the political body as »wholly one, essentially distinct from the Church«.[5]

In 1414, at the Constance synod, the five leading Western European nations – Italy, France, England, Germany and Spain – showed themselves as fixed and recognised political entities. But over the following centuries, the Holy Roman Empire and its imperial ambitions, which only ceased officially to exist in 1806, then the Ottoman invasion prevented stable national units to appear in Central Europe. From the Baltic sea to Sicily, in what S. Rokkan and D. Urwin called the ›polycephalous‹ Europe, city-states, independent cities, Kingdoms, ecclesiastical or dynastic principalities perpetuated under the aegis of the imperial dream up to the nineteenth century. In the German and Italian historical conscience, cultural identity has always been separated from political organisation. Germany and Italy were only constituted as nation-states, albeit imperfect ones, after 1870. It was a German, Friedrich Meinecke, who in 1907 elaborated the distinction between the nation-state *(Staatsnation)* and the cultural nation *(Kulturnation)*. More or less voluntarily the Germans experienced different situations at different times in their history where nation and state were separated, either ›two states, one nation‹ or ›several states, one nation‹.

Between this polycephalous Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, the Austro-Hungarian empire was still in 1914 a »conglomeration of heterogeneous States devoid of any internal cohesion«.[6] The Habsburg monarchy, a depositary of the old imperial dream, was supranational in its very principle. Charles I, the Austrian emperor and Apostle King of Hungary, was also King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomerya and Illyria, King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria, etc. The Emperor could not or would not associate himself with a specific national aspiration. The Austro-Hungarian empire, established in its last political form by the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, gathered peoples which were diverse in their historical conscience, in their religious beliefs, and convinced of their unique destiny. The Catholics, the Protestants, the Orthodox and the Muslims constituted

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4   Ernst Kantorowicz, Les Deux Corps du Roi (1957), Paris 1989, p. 146.

5   Pierre Manent, Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme, dix leçons, Paris 1987, p. 29.

6   Istvan Bibo, Misère des petits Etats d'Europe de l'Est (1946), Paris 1986, p. 144.

a medley in which the Churches divided the peoples instead of uniting them. As far as languages and the distribution between majority and minority ones were concerned, European history had also resulted in a world where the West seemed to head towards unity and the East towards dispersion. These different types of diversity could hardly be transcended by a national aim since the troubled history of the area had prevented a free bourgeoisie from emerging. The feudal tradition had remained strong, opposing the nobility to the peasants, without any political society with bourgeois citizenship.

The peoples, confronted with invaders from the East, subjected to conquerors, could not be organised into independent political units nor separated by lasting borders. Whereas between the fifteenth and eighteenth century the modern state appeared in the big Western monarchies, Germany and Italy remained politically split and the Turks destroyed the national institutional framework of Hungary and Bohemia and of the medieval kingdoms of Serbia and Croatia. When nationalism spread throughout the Central European countries in the nineteenth century, ethnic differences could not be overcome, all the more so as the borders' instability had impeded the birth of true political institutions. They had neither capital nor state apparatus, autonomous economic organisation, national elite or political culture. Furthermore, in the nationalistic age, the Romanians or Germans living, say, on the Hungarian soil, had no reason to accept the Magyars' domination in the name of the peoples' right to self determination. Historical peoples could not agree to give up their political independence, as had Britanny in the sixteenth, Alsace, Artois and Roussillon in the seventeenth or Scotland in the early eighteenth century with the 1707 Treaty of Union and Home Rule.

Eastern European nationalists, while putting forward the peoples' right to self-determination, a principle born in Western Europe, justified their demands with ethnic and linguistic arguments. They asserted their historical specificity by hating their immediate neighbours, as shown by the Romanians and Hungarians, or the Hungarians, Croatians and Serbs. Isaiah Berlin was not the first one to notice that nationalist excesses are »less felt in the societies which have benefited from political independence over long periods of time«. The fear for the very existence of national community, deeply internalized by collective conscience, nourished collective hysteria and exacerbated groundless national pride. It set the peoples against each other and prevented a democratic nation from emerging.

One would not understand how nations appeared if one neglected the link between domestic integration and external sovereignty. Spain, Portugal, England, the Netherlands and France were conquering nations, they discovered the non-European world and built large colonial empires throughout the world. External power will could not but reinforce the process of internal integration. On the contrary, the Eastern countries were conquered by non-European invaders who came from the East. In the whole Central and Balkan Europe, populations were shifted, deported, subjugated, borders moved to and fro following the Turkish advance or retreat. The peoples, submitted to an outside power, were subjects of large, partly non-European empires for centuries. They could not turn into communities of citizens within a few years.

Western ideology and Eastern Europe ideology

It is from this double experience of European history that the nation was thought out. The arguments put forward by the militants during the nationalist conflicts – the eighteenth century conflict between England and its American colonies, then between France and Germany from the revolutionary wars until the annexation of Alsace to the German *Reich* in 1870 and the First World War – were transformed into ideas.

Indeed nineteenth century thinking was still influenced by the political and ideological struggle between the French *Grande Nation*, stemming from the revolution, which referred to the new principle of legitimacy, and the old ›nation‹, in the medieval sense, or the empires derived from a dynastic or religious history. But the new principle itself could be interpreted in two ways. The peoples' demand for self-determination could be legitimised either in the name of a people of citizens or of a people resulting from an original history and culture. Though referring to the same revolutionary principle, two ideologies of the modern nation were elaborated. One cited the will of men, the other cited their ethnic and linguistic identity. The French conception, born of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary experience, was political, individualistic, rationalist and voluntarist. On the other hand, the Germans defined their nation against the French, in organicist terms, following their 1806 and 1807 military defeats. The ethnic nation based itself on a community of an original people *(Urvolk)* sharing the same ancestry, the same culture and the same past, imposed on individuals.

After the 1870 war, the controversy between French and German historians raised to the level of classical tragedy what appeared as the opposition between two ideas of the nation, which was held as essentially ›ambiguous‹. On one side, Theodor Mommsen justified the Bismarckian annexation policy by the ethnic, linguistic and cultural Germanness of Alsace, whatever the provisional will of its inhabitants. On the other, the French argued that »neither race nor language makes nationality« (Fustel de Coulanges), cited the revolutionary principles and, in the name of the legitimate »wishes of the nations« (Renan) and the »will« and »free consent« of the peoples, argued that Alsace was »French by nationality and love of homeland« (Fustel de Coulanges). The role played by the annexation of Alsace in the reflexion on the nation in Germany, France and even Italy shows how controversy and analysis were indissolubly linked.

These ideologies, which had been moulded by the nationalists in order to justify and lead collective action, were then accepted as ideas, in the analytical sense. The two ideas, formulated first by the German Romantic thinkers to build their own nation against the French, became accepted as obvious; they were analysed by theoreticians, then sanctioned by the historians of nationalist ideas.

In different national and scientific languages, the nation according to the ›French‹ (or ›Italian‹, or ›American‹) ideology would always end up being distinguished from the nation according to the ›German‹ ideology, or ›Western‹ nation was opposed to ›Eastern‹ nation, civic nation to *Volk*, ›nation-state‹ *(Staatsnation)* to ›cultural nation‹ *(Kulturnation)*, citizens to ancestors worship, political will to organic nation, elective nation to ethnic nation, nation based on contract to nation-genius, civism to populism, the individual to the nation as collective individual, the Enlightenment to Romanticism or, lastly, holism to individualism. Behind these various terms were always the same elements. The first great historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn, had already set this opposition in historical science by arguing that »freedom for the Germans was based on history and particularism, as opposed to reason and equality in France«. When a Hungarian historian put forward the idea that there was a »third Europe«, referring to Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, he characterized it as being born between the »Western« type and the »East European« model.[7]

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7   Hans Kohn, The idea of nationalism. A Study in its origin and Background, New York 1944; Jenö Szücs, Les Trois Europe, Paris 1985.

This series of dual oppositions was all the more rooted in the minds as they recalled nineteenth century thought on new society born of the industrial and political revolution and of modern political legitimacy. They were also part of the more general philosophical discussion on liberty and necessity.

The move from historical description to theory, which characterizes the reflexion on the nation, still has repercussions today. After he has described the two historical ›trajectories‹ which actually led to the building of nations, Anthony Smith draws the conclusion that there are two ›concepts‹ of the nation, a territorial-civic one and a genealogical-ethnic one: »The concept of the nation is found to be inherently unstable and dualists.«[8] John Plamenatz, by opposing nineteenth century German and Italian nationalism to the Balkan people's demands, also referred to the double idea of the nation: the former, already united around a great culture, demanded to be recognized as an independent political entity and to form a civic nation; the latter, in search of a common culture, with unstable and changing historical and ethnic allegiance, aspired to form an »ethnic« nation.[9]

One should note that, in practice, every national tradition is dual – whether it be intellectual history or historical reality. Not all the Germans ignored the political conception of the nation: Louis Dumont recalls that »Herder's mention of different cultural communities is one aspect of German acculturation to the developed form of individualism and combines a holistic aspect with an individualistic one«.[10] In France, anti-revolutionary writers like Joseph de Maistre or Louis de Bonald followed Burke's passionate criticism of the revolutionary idea of the nation *à la française*. But these very criticisms imply that there actually are two ideas of the nation, even if they may be combined in concrete historical nations.

This intellectual tradition perpetuates itself today, even more so as it may be a tool to analyse some present realities. Comparative analysis of citizenship laws and immigration policies in France and Germany shows that the opposition between the nation-contract and the nation-genius has not lost its appeal, that it still permeates the minds and is expressed in law. Comparing the French and German citizen-

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8   Smith, Anthony D., The ethnic origins of nations, New York/London 1986, p. 4.

9   J. Plamenatz, Two types of nationalism, in: Eugène Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism. The nature and evolution of an idea, London 1976, pp. 22–37.

10   Louis Dumont, L'idéologie allemande. France-Allemagne et retour, Paris 1991, p. 24.

ship laws is revealing. In France, the automatic or quasi-automatic ways of acquiring citizenship, the importance of mere declaration (for instance for French people's foreign spouses), the right to be reintegrated (for those who have lost citizenship) give some rights to the individual against the state. The small cost of application and the liberal implementation of the nationality laws still give in practice wide access to French citizenship not only to the individuals born and educated in France, but also to almost all the foreigners settled in France for a long time and who apply for it. French policy still aims at integrating the populations of foreign origin in the name of citizenship. The Germans on the other hand maintain an ethnic conception of the national link. Many contemporary authors still evoke the linguistic and historical community rather than political will. The »German blood« idea is still alive among the population. The almost exclusive respect of *ius sanguinis*, expressed in the citizenship laws based on a 1913 law, results in refusing citizenship to foreigners even when they have lived in Germany regularly and for a long time, sometimes two or three generations, even if they are acculturated to German society and culture, whereas it is granted to those living in e.g. Poland or Russia who can claim German ancestors.[11]

Thus European history crystallized into a fundamental and insurmountable ideological opposition – defined as a system of ideas and values turned into political action – what was mainly due to different histories. The socially constituted ideas of the nation have been used as instruments of nationalist struggles in Europe since the French revolution. Although ideas are necessarily objects in history, insofar as they are a means used by social actors to conceive and build nations, its study ought not to be confused with sociological analysis. »Binary oppositions are an analytical procedure, but their usefulness does not guarantee that reality can thus be divided. We must be suspicious vis-à-vis anyone asserting there are two kinds of people, two kinds of reality or process.«[12]

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11   Dominique Schnapper, La France de l'intégration, Sociologie de la nation en 1990, Paris 1991, pp. 51ff.; idem, L'Europe des immigrés. Essai sur les politiques d'immigration, Paris 1992; Rogers W. Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass. 1992.

12   Mary Douglas, Judgements on James Frazer, in: Daedalus, 107. (Fall) 1978, No. 4, pp. 151–164.

A single idea of nation

The intellectual and political legacy is not enough to explain how entrenched this opposition is. Not only are binary oppositions comfortable, but the ›theory‹ of the two ideas of the nation is based on the features of democratic nation.

Indeed the nation is best defined by its aim, which is to *transcend through citizenship particularities*, whether they be biological (or perceived as such), historical, economic, social, religious or cultural; to define the citizen as an abstract individual, without particular identification or label, below and beyond his concrete characteristics.[13] What makes the modern nation specific is that it integrates all populations into a community of citizens and it legitimizes the action of the state (its instrument) by this community; so it implies universal suffrage – *all* citizens[14] involved in choosing their governments and judging the way power is exercised; and conscription – *all* citizens involved in foreign intervention. This double participation is undoubtedly true, but it first and foremost symbolises political legitimity. It is both the nature and the ideal of democratic nationhood.

Secularism, particularly, is an essentiel attribute of modern state because it transcends the numerous religious identities, shifts religious beliefs and practices into the private sphere, and turns the public sphere into a religious-free space to which all citizens belong, whatever their religion.[15] Secularism shows that the social link is no longer religious but national, and therefore political. The national project is universal not only because it is meant to encompass all those who are in the same nation, but also because going beyond particularities through political means can in principle be adopted in any society. Universalism is the horizon of the ideology of liberty and equality, a basis of the idea of nation.

The universal quality of the republican idea, of the ›civic nation‹ according to Kant, combined with the particular aspect of the ethnic groups from which the nation was built and which are still alive under more or less recognized forms, explains

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13 Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation, Paris 1994.

14 Even if in practice the conception of the universal »citizen« evolved since its »reign« was proclaimed; see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen, Paris 1992.

15 Which does not preclude different kinds of collaboration between the State, religious groups and Churches.

the tension between universalism and particularism, which is a constituent of the nation. The variety of cultural and ideological references is implied by the very definition of the nation. Nations were historically built from one or several pre-existing ethnic groups. Insofar as it transcends pre-existing ethnicity, ›proto-nationalism‹, nationalities or religions according to specific modes and political traditions, each nation is unique.

On the other hand, the state, whose institutions and ideology tend to assimilate the population to the national culture, reinforces this uniqueness. Indeed asserting the principle of citizenship would not be in itself sufficient to create a community of citizens. Sovereignty and citizenship are fictions. You cannot rally individuals to such abstract ideas. They can only be actually integrated if some concrete realities, values and interests justify the inevitable constraints of collective life and their adherence to foreign action – which may entail the loss of their lives. Their integration can only be achieved as a result of the continuous action of common institutions, in the wide Durkheimian sense of the word – constituted forms of practice through which generations pass on the ways of being and living together which characterize a specific historical society.

The tension between the nation's self-proclaimed universality and the specific pre-national ethnic groups that government policies tend to reinforce explains why the opposition between the ›two ideas‹ of the nation remained for so long. The advocates and the theoreticians of the civic nation would stress the uprooting of specific bonds through citizenship; the advocates of the ethnic nation would put forward the strength, value and genuine nature of these roots.

If one agrees to define democratic nation by the never-fulfilled aim of creating a political society by transcending concrete roots and specific membership, there are not two ideas of nation, but one, unevenly and differently achieved, following each time a different pattern according to the political project which is at the basis of nation-building.

The nations which were traditionnally called civic, Western, *à l'américaine* or *à la française* according to countries and intellectual traditions, insofar as they were true to their logic and their proclaimed ideal, were closer to this idea or ideal-type, for they saw political society and citizenship as the principle organising social life. This is not a value judgement asserting the moral or political superiority of the political nation over ethnic nation, but the conclusions drawn from an analytical definition.

My aim is not to say French national ideology is the model for any nation. Of course I am not arguing that the French example is the universal model for the nation. It is only an illustration, for historical reasons. Whereas the English nation was born of an endogenous process and of pragmatic adaptation of the political organisation to the necessities of democracy, civic nation suddenly broke out as a revolution in France. It was immediately reflected on and staged. The principles of nation-building were thought in France as in no other country and the republican, integrationist and universalist model was constantly referred to in public and scientific life. The legitimacy and sovereignty of the nation, the need to submit specific identities and cultures to it and secularism have been proclaimed there with more vigour than elsewhere; since the Revolution the nation and its features have been uninterruptedly debated. England practically invented the idea of nation as community of free and equal citizens; the French endlessly theorized the individual citizenship and universality of political society and strived to build it in a voluntarist way – which does not mean, as American scholars often remind us, that they were always faithful to their own theories. One can even wonder whether they haven't all the more proclaimed the principles as these were not always easily applied.

The nationalists and ideologists of ethnic or *à l'allemande* nation cited pre- national values and not *specific* or *characteristic* values of the nation, a particular form of political organisation in the democratic age. Ethnic nation ideology was a means of justifying the failure of the nation in Central and Eastern Europe. If Central European nationalism can indeed be described as ethnic, as much by its features as by the arguments the nationalist thinkers used, it does not follow there is an ethnical idea – in the analytical sense – of the nation. By insisting on pre-existing ethnic links rather than on the objective of creating a political society, the advocates of ›ethnic nation‹ failed to grasp what really defines national ambition, the momentum, albeit imperfect, towards overcoming particularism and ethnic loyalty, even if it expresses itself in a tension between universality and the state keeping national features alive.

Why Are There Minorities in Europe?

By Panikos Panayi

In 1945 Europe emerged torn apart by a war in which ethnic, national and racial differences had determined allies and enemies. Superficially, the following five decades of the continent's history appear to represent an attempt to heal the wounds of centuries of conflict. In reality, ethnic differences have continued to perform a fundamental role in the development of all nation-states and systems of government within Europe in societies in which origin plays a central role in determining which individuals obtain economic and political rewards. This point applies to every nation-state in Europe, from Scandinavia to Turkey, and from Great Britain to the Soviet Union.

All periods of human history have almost certainly witnessed intolerance by one group of people towards another, justified by the concept of superiority even in pre-literate cultures. Imperialism, which has risen and fallen several times during the entire course of European history, represents the first important form of political organisation and control to bring dominant groupings, with their administrative control and culture, into contact with minorities who are different to them in a variety of ways. Imperial control of Europe has been important, at various times, from the expansion of the Roman Empire until the contraction and final collapse of the Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires culminating in defeat during the First World War.

Since then, the main form of political organisation in postwar Europe has consisted of the nation-state based upon the idea of nationalism. In contrast to the empires which dominated Europe during the early modern period, the nation-states which have replaced them cover smaller areas, impose a more direct control and claim to be the embodiment of all the people which are covered by their territory. »Received opinion holds that nationalism in the modern sense does not date back further than the revolutionary political turmoil that troubled the second half of the eighteenth century«[1], meaning, of course, the American and French Revolutions. Nationalism has been like a Pandora's box: Once opened, in 1776,

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[1]   Peter Alter, Nationalism, 2nd. ed. London 1994, p. 39.

the release of its US personification was followed, within the European continent, firstly in the west and gradually moving eastward, by further spirits describing themselves as nationalities, so that there exist an endless number of groupings wishing to organise themselves as nations.

However, nationalism did not spring up overnight, but obviously had roots. Specifically, all nations have ethnic origins demonstrated in »their historical memories and central values […] ›carried‹ in and by forms of genres of artefacts and activities which change only very slowly« so that these memories and values »tend to be exceptionally durable« with the ability to last for centuries.[2] However, a political, social and economic transformation obviously needs to take place in order for these memories to become part of the national myth of a particular state. More importantly, from the point of view of dating the origins of nationalism, is that we might prefer to place its birth from the English Revolutions of the seventeenth century, because, by 1800, England and Britain certainly existed as a nation-state in terms of the national idea and the form of political organisation, although both of these have become more sophisticated during the following two hundred years.

But nations and states differ and there is nothing inevitable in the existence of the nation-state. Apart from empires, other forms of state control also existed in pre-modern Europe in the form of states which covered particular areas varying from city republics, especially characteristic of early modern Germany and Italy, to much larger land masses which encompassed areas which approximate to contemporary nation-states, including Spain, France and England. But none of these were actually nation-states because the monarchy represented the embodiment of nation rather than the people and »national historiography […] extolled the nation in terms of its landscapes and resources rather than the character of its inhabitants.«[3] Nationalism has essentially represented a transformation of the state since the eighteenth century to focus, in theory, upon the people who live within it.

At the end of the twentieth century the nation-state »is a construct which we now take for granted as a ›natural‹ or eternal political state of affairs.«[4] Nationalism is

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2   Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford 1986, pp. 15–16.

3   John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester 1982, p. 45.

4   Gérard Chaliand, Minority People in the Age of Nation States, in: idem. (ed.), Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States, London 1989, p. 1.

now simply orthodoxy. Except for scholars working in the area, very few people ever give a thought to the fact that they live in nation-states and that it may be possible for them not to exist. The banality of nationalism is not represented by concepts such as fighting for one's country, but by the everyday events of reading newspapers, especially true of English ones, in which news is dominated by events in that particular country. What really matters is not what happened the previous day but what happened in England or to England the previous day. Or to give another example, of the banality of nationalism, we can point to the symbolic, mystic or even sacred value of a passport, which allows individuals to cross national boundaries but without which a person is, literally, a non-entity. In postwar Europe the passport has the mystic value of a medieval crucifix: it is sacred. The reason for this is clear. One of the fundamental developments which has taken place since the seventeenth century Enlightenment has been the declining role of religion, particularly during the last fifty years. Its place has been taken by nationalism. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to describe this ideology as having the same influence over contemporary Europe as Christianity did, in both its eastern and western varieties, before the Reformation. In fact, it is more accurate to say that its control is more complete because it is both political and ideological, whereas the medieval papacy had no direct power over most of Western Europe.

This situation did not develop overnight, but the transformation did take place fairly rapidly so that by 1914 millions of people were prepared to *die* for their country. The reasons for these developments lie in a complex series of changes in Europe, affecting economy, society, politics and culture. The main social and economic change in European society during the past two centuries has clearly been the transformation of virtually the entire continent from one in which the agrarian means of production dominated to one in which industry has become completely dominant. Several theorists of nationalism regard this development as fundamental in the spread of the nation-state and very few ignore it altogether.

The ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, while not always consistent, regarded nationalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie, used to divide proletarians of one nation from those of another and therefore allowing bourgeois values to become dominant. This process was integral in the evolution from feudalism to capitalism.[5] Stalin believed that »a nation is not merely a historical category but a historical

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[5] Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton, NJ 1984, pp. 6–9.

category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism«, when the bourgeoisie became the dominant class. At this stage, »the chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of another nationality. Hence its desire to secure its ›own‹, its ›home‹ market«.[6] All Marxist ideas on nationalism have rested upon the belief that nationalism would disappear with the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

But not only the practitioners of Marxism focus upon industrialization as central to the development of nation-states. One of the most brilliant exponents of this view was the social anthropologist, the late Ernest Gellner, who pointed to the need for a national culture in the new industrial economies in which all sections of the population need to communicate for the purpose of increasing affluence. In pre-industrial economies only a minority bureaucratic class required education while the bulk of the population got on with subsistence food production.[7] Elie Kedourie, meanwhile, dating the birth of nationalism from the conventionally accepted period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, concentrated upon the philosophical and ideological developments of these years, resulting in the individual and collective desire to achieve self-determination, epitomised by German nationalists before 1848.[8]

The ideas of both Gellner and Kedourie are fundamental in explaining the birth and growth of nationalism. Gellner, together with other theorists, including Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson have focused upon the artificiality of national ideas within specific locations. Gellner views all nationalism as a consequence of the age of industry. While some national ideas may have agrarian origins, the essence of nationalism is the fact that it arrives with the age of industrialization and therefore creates new ideas in a new age of economic activity.[9] Hobsbawm, mean-while, concentrating upon the period 1870–1914 has demonstrated the way in which European nation-states invented traditions about themselves which involved creating national education systems, public ceremonies and public

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6   Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, London 1936, pp. 13, 15.

7   Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford 1983.

8   Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Fourth, Expanded Edition, Oxford 1993.

9   Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 48–52.

monuments.[10] Finally, Benedict Anderson focuses upon the ›imagined communities‹ within nation-states. Like Hobsbawm, he looks at some of the institutions of nationalism, but his main criticism towards nation-states focuses on the large numbers of people living in so-called national communities »because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.«[11]

Nationalism is therefore inextricably linked with the process of industrialization. While nation-states may have deep rooted origins, which represent a basis for subsequent elaboration, they are human creations. Like the modern age and the industry which accompanies it, their essence is standardisation, rationalisation and centralisation. The end product therefore represents an artificial culture in the form of the nation-state, as artificial as the industrial goods produced by the industry which dominates the new form of political organisation. These new political creations initially came into existence for the benefit of the classes who would most benefit by the creation of an internal market which allowed free movement of their goods in the form of industrialists. However, during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the working classes have been made to believe in the nation-state, while, for the national movements emerging throughout Europe during the last two centuries, proletarians have often been needed as fodder in the political insurrection needed for the overthrow of imperial domination by a ›foreign‹ power.

By the start of the twentieth century, nation-states had become accepted as the only legitimate form of political organisation within Europe, which meant that the imperial powers centred on Constantinople and Vienna were doomed. The division of Europe into nation-states was by this time inevitable, although there was nothing inevitable about which countries would come into existence. However, the new states in Europe, especially its eastern half, would also contain minorities within their new borders because of the complexity of historically evolved settlement patterns. The determinants of the boundaries of new nation-states included the linguistic and ethnic characteristics of particular areas, their numbers, their

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10   Eric Hobsbawm, Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914, in: idem./Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Mass. 1983, pp. 263–283.

11   Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Revised Edition, London 1991, p. 6.

ability to mobilize themselves into national movements, and the attitudes of the Great Powers. These factors have remained important until the end of the twentieth century and the collapse of communism, as they also played a role in the state building processes at the end of the two World Wars when the attitudes of the victorious powers played the determining role.

At this stage we can attempt a definition of a ›nation-state‹, which creates a variety of problems. Several theorists have broken the term into its constituent parts. James G Kellas speaks of a nation as »a group of people bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry«[12], sounding very much like Stalin's ›objective‹ definition: »A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture […] It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation.«[13] This argument is also put forward by Walker Connor, who explains such views simply by equating a nation with an ethnic group, but not with a state.[14] Kellas prefers to use three different terms. An *ethnic nation*, is »where a nation consists of one ethnic group, *social nation*, where several ethnic groups form one nation«, and *official nation*, referring to »the nationalism of the state«.[15] While not completely rejecting the idea that some nation-states are more real than others, in the sense that they may consist of a more ethnically composite people, the basis of my argument rests upon the artificiality of nationalism and its creations. As Hobsbawm recognises, all »objective definitions have failed, for the obvious reason that, since only some members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time be described as ›nations‹, exceptions can always be found«.[16] Walker Connor has analysed this statistically claiming that »out of 132 entities generally considered to be states as of 1971«, only 12 or 9.1% »can justifiably 0be described as nation-states«[17], with a unitary ethnic group, although even this seems an exaggerated figure.

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12   James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Basingstoke 1991, p. 2.

13   Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, pp. 8–9.

14   Walker Connor, A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a …, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1. 1978, no. 4, p. 388.

15   Kellas, Politics of Nationalism, p. 3.

16   Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality, 2nd. ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1992, pp. 5–6.

17   Connor, A Nation is a Nation, p. 382.

The essence of the nation-state is political control, as made clear in the opening sentence of Gellner's *tour de force*: »Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.«[18] Taking the above discussion into account, my definition of a nation-state would be as follows. It is a method of political organisation which has developed in the age of industrialization and in which the life blood consists of an artificial culture which has been introduced by those in command of political power, who usually control the economy. It aims at standardisation and efficiency, achieved through the establishment of a series of institutions which facilitate the passage of culture through the whole economy. The most important of these is a national education system, which spreads knowledge of the national language and educates children primarily in the geography, history and literature of their own state. In addition, a series of more political organs hold the nation-state together including representative institutions, whatever the system of government, an army, in which those who claim citizenship should be prepared to die, and a national taxation system, an essential lubricant in keeping the nation-state together. There exist further the clothes, or symbols of nationalism, which display the existence of a nation-state, which include the national flag, the national anthem, and a national football team, without which a country would remain naked, a primitive and not fully developed nation-state. Finally, the sacred national boundaries define the extent of the nation-state.

Not all states in postwar Europe fit comfortably into the above definition. The Soviet Union, together with other federal states, such as Switzerland and Yugoslavia, tended to allow a certain amount of autonomy, demonstrated in language use, education and local self-rule. However, above these there still existed, ultimately, the concept of a Soviet people, Swiss people and a Yugoslav people, with central representative institutions, national citizenship, national flags and national anthems. Even in the Soviet Union, with its confused nationalities policy the idea of a Soviet people spread after the Second World War, and became legalised in the 1977 constitution. Furthermore, there also existed the lubricant of Russian culture, despite the aspects of local autonomy.[19] Interpretations of the Soviet Union as an empire seem tempting and may have much to recommend them, especially the

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18   Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.1.

19   Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR, London 1987, pp. 38–39; René Tangac, The Soviet Response to the Minority Problem, in: Chaliand, Minority People, p. 105; Connor, National Question, pp. 392–407.

range of people living within its borders, the size of the land mass and the inheritance of this land mass from the Tsars. However, the federated structure of the Soviet Union, and its local autonomy, especially in its European part, ultimately do not make it any different from other federated states in postwar Europe. Like other states which fell under the influence of state socialism, they behaved, from our perspective, in the same way as their liberal democratic counterparts.

It is not possible for all members of a nation-state to fit into the straightjacket created by nationalism, which inevitably leads to the creation of minorities. In liberal democracies, these can be social minorities, particularly in the early stages of industrialization when bourgeois culture is first imposed from above, meaning that the working classes develop their own alternative culture[20], while the peasantry, in the short run, remain outside either of these new cultures, continuing to live their lives as they always had done until the instruments of the nation-state eventually manage to reel them into the body politic.

Our concern lies with minorities of another sort, who can all be described by the catch-all term of ethnic minorities, which, however, encompasses a large variety of groupings in modern European history. It would be wrong to suggest that all minorities came into existence simply as a result of the growth of nationalism. The history of medieval European Jewry would warn us against this, both because of their residential segregation and because of the persecution they faced, particularly during the Crusades. During the Middle Ages the essence of Jewish minority status lay in religion together with an almost unique economic activity. Upon their arrival in medieval and early modern Europe, the gypsies were automatically recognised as different and faced universal hostility, often manifesting itself in legislation. We could further point to the religious minorities, although they were only sometimes ethnic, resulting from the reformation and counter-reformation.

The process of state creation from the end of the eighteenth century resulted in new minorities where they did not previously exist as such in the empires which controlled early modern Central and Eastern Europe. This is not to deny that these peoples with their own distinctive language and folklore had not already lived in these areas. Thus, while Albanians may have existed as a group for centuries, the creation of new states in the areas where they lived, with more direct control and

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20   See Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions, pp. 283–291.

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with the implementation of a state culture which claimed to represent all members of the population which lived within the artificial boundaries which had been drawn up, inevitably resulted in a reaction against the new, more direct form of political control by groups of people who spoke a different language, practised a different religion or felt themselves to be different in other ways.

In order to proceed further we need to pause for a definition of minorities, which has been attempted by a large number of authorities. There are basically two determining factors. First, differences, which revolve around origin and manifest themselves in three basic ways: appearance, encompassing physiognomy and dress; religion; and language. Minorities often possess more than one of these characteristics or all of them, as in the case, for instance, of Pakistani immigrants in Britain. The minorities »are subcultures« maintaining some or all of the above »behavioural characteristics« that »in some degree, set them off from society's mainstream or modal, culture.« They feel these differences provide them with »sense of community« which differentiates them from the dominant group within any nation-state.[21] Consequently, they are a product of nationalism, because they would have regarded these differences as natural in an age before nation-states, and would not have felt the need to demonstrate their differences to a centralising culture with which they had no connection. »The problem of national minorities arises out of the conflict between the ideal of the homogeneous nation-state and the reality of ethnic heterogeneity«[22] in any given geographical area which is turned into a nation-state by drawing lines on maps described as national boundaries. Following on from this, the second universal characteristic inherent in all minority groups consists of the fact that »they are relatively lacking in power and hence are subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations, and other differential treatments.«[23] This does not mean, of course, that all minorities are completely powerless, or that they all suffer the same types and level of prejudice, as this differs from one case to another. The number of members of a minority group varies enormously in the case of Europe. No groups form a majority within any particular nation-state, although they can do within a particular area of that nation-state, such

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[21]   Martin N. Maryer, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives, 2nd. ed. Belmont, CA 1991, pp. 12–13.

[22]   I.L. Claude, National Minorities: An International Problem, 2nd. ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1969, p. 1.

[23]   Arnold M. Rose, Minorities, in: David L. Sill (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 10, New York 1968, p. 365.

as, to give one of many examples, the Spanish Basques. In some nation-states two groupings of similar numerical size exist, such as Belgium, in which it is difficult to apply the term minority, and in which ethnic groupings can act as an alternative term.

The long history of settlement within Europe has meant that there exist within the continent as a whole an enormous variety of minorities. They consist of those who were indigenous before 1945, although many of them may have moved into or across Europe tens, hundreds or thousands of years before the twentieth century, and immigrants, migrants and refugees, who settled in a new area after the Second World War. Indigenous minorities include people distinguished from dominant groupings for a wide variety of reasons, whether religion, as in the case of Jews and Balkan Muslims, language, of which there are countless examples, allegiance to another state, such as East European Germans, or way of life, as in the case of gypsies.

In fact, it is most useful to divide European minorities into three categories, consisting of dispersed peoples, localised minorities and refugees. All have the basic characteristic of counting small numbers within a particular state, distinguishing themselves through appearance, language or religion, and having limited political power. They have, collectively, evolved as minorities over the course of periods of time varying from decades to centuries.

The dispersed European minorities divide comfortably into four groups. The first of these, Jews, already lived in Europe during the classical period and gradually moved west and north over subsequent centuries. Gypsies appeared in Eastern Europe, originating in India, from about the twelfth century and, again, moved west and north. These two minorities have always been outsiders throughout European history, both before and after the age of the nation-state.

Slightly different, are two dispersed groupings concentrated on the eastern half of the continent in the form of Germans and Muslims. The former moved eastward from a variety of areas of core German settlement from as early as the tenth century to find themselves, by 1919, living throughout the newly created states which followed the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, but focused especially upon Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Muslims moved into Eastern Europe, from further east in this case, as a result of imperial encouragement from the Ottoman Empire. Like the Germans, they found them-

selves as minorities in the new states which followed the collapse of the great European empires at the start of the twentieth century. A significant difference between Muslims and Germans is that the former also consist, in some instances, of the descendants of indigenous peoples who converted to Islam following the Ottoman invasions of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece.

The other major category of pre-1945 minorities are those which are particular to small areas of Europe or to individual states. In some cases these consist of, what we can describe as, primeval peoples who have lived in their localities for hundreds or thousands of years. Examples of such groupings include the Lapps of Scandinavia, the Kurds of Turkey and native peoples of Russia. These became minorities due to varying processes, the Lapps because of state creation and extension, the Kurds because of the replacement of the Ottoman Empire by the Turkish state with its centralising tendencies, and native peoples of Russia due to imperial expansion.

Other minorities, with a more recent lineage, were created in similar ways. Here we can mention groups who are the victims of localised boundary changes, especially in Eastern Europe, where examples include Hungarians in Rumania and Czechoslovakia and Greeks in Albania. In addition, we can also mention the Baltic peoples who found themselves persecuted minorities in the Stalinist state which annexed them at the outbreak of the Second World War. The creation of Yugoslavia aggravated minority problems within that region.

Migrants, immigrants and refugees, are postwar arrivals. No other fifty year period in the history of Europe has seen as much immigration as that which has taken place since 1945. The entire continent has been affected at some stage either by taking up population or by surrendering people to another part of Europe. Population movements in postwar Europe fall comfortably, though not perfectly, into three phases. The first of these covers the years immediately following the end of the war and the population movements during the initial years of peace, which particularly affected the areas which the Nazis had controlled. The tens of millions of people on the move included victims of Nazism, in the form of foreign workers used by the German economy and former inmates of the camp system, German expellees from the victorious and vindictive regimes which followed the defeat of the Nazis, and victims of Stalinism, attempting to escape from that particular system of totalitarianism, but in many cases forced back by the agreements of the Allies at the end of the war.

The second phase of European migration essentially represents the search for labour supplies to act as fodder for the expansion of the European economies which took place until the early 1970s. For those states with colonies, notably Britain, France and the Netherlands, they had obvious supplies of labour, but they also used workers from the European periphery, as did Germany and Switzerland and virtually the rest of Northwest Europe. Push factors play a subordinate role in this second phase of migration because the determining factor in causing population movement consisted of the initiative of business and industry in the receiving state. However, in many cases, such as Turkey and Italy, the government of the sending society pursued a policy of exporting population as part of a solution to domestic overpopulation and underdevelopment. Tens of millions of people migrated to Western Europe during this period, which finally ended by the mid-1970s. In the eastern half of the continent a few foreign workers moved to the German Democratic Republic, while millions of people migrated within the Soviet Union, especially Russians who moved to the Baltic Republics and Central Asia in an attempt to develop the economies of those regions.

The third phase of postwar European migration, from the middle of the 1970s, involved several contradictory developments. First, the slamming shut of doors by the Western European industrial democracies to migrants from all over the world. Second, an increase in the number of people who actually wished to move towards the wealthy parts of Western Europe, especially following the political changes consequent upon the Cold War. Third, many of the countries on the Mediterranean periphery which previously experienced emigration now found themselves acting as importers of migrants from Eastern Europe and North Africa. At the same time, the fact that the EC allows free movement of labour has meant that many nationals of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal can now move into North and Western Europe without the need for labour transfer agreements previously necessary.

Whatever type of minority we are dealing with, their social and economic characteristics distinguish them from the dominant populations and form the basis of their powerless position. Although exceptions exist, they tend to have slightly higher fertility rates and reside in poorer areas than the dominant populations of a particular state. Often they live in more rural environments or if they are concentrated in cities they tend to find themselves residing in the poorest areas. Furthermore, in the case of some minorities, such as the Scots or the Lapps, they live in peripheral areas of states in which they will always remain marginalised. They have no hope of controlling these political entities unless they fully assimilate them-

selves into the dominant population. They are essentially victims of internal colonialism.

Taking immigrants specifically, they have concentrated in cities for the obvious reason that big business and government imported them to assist in the postwar economic boom. Because of the reality of their status, lying at the bottom of the social ladder, immigrants have tended to live in the worst housing because of their recent arrival and the level of their wages. At the same time the prejudice of the dominant populations of Western European states forced immigrants into the ethnic ghettos which they developed.

The geographic and demographic patterns of European minorities replicate themselves in their economic and social status. Indeed, all aspects of the social and economic life of peoples throughout the European continent remain closely linked. In the classic pattern, the groupings residing in the worst housing conditions with the highest birth and mortality rates would find themselves employed in the least desirable occupations shunned by the dominant grouping. This is the most common paradigm. The situation applies equally to imported immigrants and to indigenous populations. Thus, while most Western European states, to a greater or lesser extent, brought in people from the Mediterranean periphery or further afield to help in the postwar economic boom, regimes in the eastern half of the continent exploited their own surplus population for the same purpose. This surplus population often consisted of a minority, as the example of gypsies in Czechoslovakia would indicate. Most minorities therefore represent victims of economic exploitation although, unlike the dominant population, they have difficulties in socially progressing, often experiencing unusually high rates of unemployment.

The status of minorities is further perpetuated by racist government and popular opinion, which do not respect them and ultimately try, in a variety of ways, to eliminate them. The methods employed have varied enormously and have depended upon a series of factors which have included historical traditions of a particular nation-state, the system of government and immediate circumstances.

National governments try to accommodate and yet discriminate against non-dominant groupings. In societies with large pre-modern minorities, numerous attempts have been made at some form of power sharing on a national level, some of them successful, most notably Switzerland and Great Britain, which have evolved historically. Newer states such as Rumania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet

Union, pursued fairly successful forms of power sharing for a period but, in the case of the last two, collapsed with the fall of communism. Elsewhere, notably Spain, regional identity was ignored by Franco, although some progress was subsequently made, but not enough to satisfy the separatists, a similar situation to that which exists in the UK, France and Belgium.

All states pass legislation aimed at minorities. In the first place, they demonstrate a concern for nationality laws, especially those with recent immigrants and refugees. A basic difference exists between those states which grant citizenship according to place of birth, of which Britain and France were classic examples, and those which reserve it for people who can claim ancestry, notably Germany and Switzerland. However, during the 1980s Britain and France, in attempts to hammer the last nails in the coffin of immigration into their countries, have introduced legislation which does not automatically grant citizenship to people born within their borders.

The passage of legislation aimed at creating multi-racial states is always a charade aimed at pacifying minority activists and the conscience of the progressive liberal bourgeoisie. While so-called multi-racial societies may offer the opportunity to members of minorities to progress upwards on the social ladder, they cannot seize these opportunities when they are at the bottom of the economic pile. It might be unfortunate, but it is completely true that Czechoslovak gypsies, blacks in Britain or France, and Turks in Germany do not tend to become lawyers or academics. A genuine multi-racial society is one in which minorities would hold a proportionate share of economic and political power and few such societies have ever existed. Belgium may be an example of an exception, but it is one which requires regular constitutional changes to maintain the correct balance of power. In any case, the Belgian constitution only works for Walloons and Flemings as postwar immigrants are very much ignored.

›Public opinion‹ helps to exclude minority groups in all nation-states. The media forms the opinions of the dominant population which practices its hostility towards minorities in a variety of ways. The visual, aural and written media all play a central role in the perpetuation of hostility towards minority groupings. All three media operate using national stereotypes which are ever-present but vary according to the audience at which they are directed and the nation-state in which they operate, as well as varying according to the minority under the spotlight. Thus, in postwar Britain, Afro-Caribbeans have received far more attention than Cypriots. At the same time, hostility towards out-groups intensifies at times of perceived stress

such as economic crisis, political upheaval, war and large-scale, uncontrolled immigration. Examples of the first two playing a role include the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland during the middle of the 1960s and the anti-Turkish stereotypes put forward in Bulgaria during the 1980s. Clearly, the war in Yugoslavia severely affected views of individual media towards their internal and external enemies.

The perpetuation of ethnic stereotypes affects everyday relations between majority populations and outgroups. Most individuals in most states practice some form of discrimination. This can simply take the form of refusal to enter into friendships, relationships or marriage with members of a minority community. Economic relations between minorities and dominant groupings are also influenced by origin. These relations vary from the everyday shopping experience to discrimination in employment, faced by groups throughout the continent. The reactions of trade unions also exclude immigrants as the examples of early postwar Britain and France illustrate.

Racist political groupings help to whip up racism and have existed in all liberal democracies, both before and after the fall of communism. Virtually every western liberal state has a tradition of racist parties covering the entire postwar period with direct or less concrete, ideological, links with interwar fascism. These groupings have usually arisen as an immediate and direct response to an increase in immigration as the British *National Front*, the French *Front National* and the German *Republikaner* demonstrate. In all three cases, social, economic and political factors played a role in the level of support which the groupings attracted. During the 1990s extreme political parties have also sprung up in most of the new democracies of Eastern Europe, notably Russia and Rumania.

Finally, racist violence leaves its victims in no doubt that they are minorities. Physical attacks upon individuals of a different ethnic grouping have always been everyday occurrences, which are now measured in western liberal democracies. The perpetrators of such crimes, who may or may not have connections with extreme right-wing parties, aim either simply to injure the party concerned or, in some cases, to murder him, an eventuality which has become common, especially affecting immigrants in Britain since the 1950s and Germany after re-unification. With the liberalisation of the Soviet bloc, popular disturbances became xenophobic in their manifestations focusing upon members of other competing minorities, illustrated most notably by events in Nagorno-Karabak and in riots against gypsies in Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The most serious form of violence con-

sists of ethnic cleansing. This took place on a small scale in Cyprus during the 1960s and, especially, during 1974, on both occasions accompanied by physical force. However, the phrase is most closely associated with Yugoslavia where the forced movement of populations has been accompanied by killing on a significant scale, which is regarded as genocide.

In the view of the determination of all states and their populations to exclude out-groups, it is not surprising that minorities choose to emphasise their difference. However, we need to recognise that ethnicity is an artificial notion, which only comes into existence because groups of people within a nation-state feel threatened by the dominant political culture. Nevertheless, the ethnic groups which develop do have a basis upon which to build, although the politicization of difference means just as much standardization as the development of larger scale nationalism. In reality, different ethnic groups are extremely diverse in terms, for instance, of class, ethnicity, origin and language.

Language and religion play the most important roles in distinguishing a minority from the dominant community although there are instances in which members of ethnic groups do not speak a different language from the dominant population, including Jews, some gypsies and the people of Yugoslavia, most of whom spoke Serbo-Croat. However, even within individual minorities linguistic differences exist. In the case of Indians in Britain, for instance, these encompass a diversity of linguistic traditions. If a language has developed sufficiently and an ethnic group has established some sort of political power, an existing nation-state often gives the language recognition, allowing it to be taught to varying degrees, depending upon the power of the group which speaks it.

Religion has, historically, played a central role in distinguishing ethnic groups and continues to do so. In some cases, notably the ubiquitous Jews, their faith is the source from which all aspects of their lives spring. Religion is also a characteristic of ethnic life in particular parts of the continent. The most obvious examples are the areas formerly under Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Just as important is the Soviet Union where not only Judaism survived Stalin and his successors, but also Islam in the southern periphery, Protestantism in the Baltic and the Uniate and Orthodox Churches in the Ukraine. The arrival of immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia has also introduced Islam in a big way to much of Western Europe, especially Britain, France and Germany, while also reaching countries such as Norway, where refugees from Iran have been instrumental in its introduction.

Other aspects of the lives of minorities also distinguish them from majorities. These include dress, which plays a central role in differentiating Asian and North African immigrants in Britain and France respectively. Diet also helps to maintain ethnic differences, again especially in the case of immigrants. In situations such as postwar Britain, with its bland diet, the provision of spices for Asian newcomers is fundamental, a situation which exists, with less extreme contrasts, amongst Turks in Germany. For gypsies, similar eating patterns exist all over Europe where, for instance, hedgehogs, cooked in a similar fashion everywhere, are enjoyed as delicacies.

The highest level of ethnic consciousness is reached when political organisations develop, taking a variety of forms. Amongst immigrants they can simply consist of bodies campaigning for the rights of a particular group within the country of settlement. Refugees, meanwhile, usually continue their previous activities in their new country, a good contemporary example consisting of the Kurdistan Communist Party (PKK) campaigning throughout Germany but also in more localised settlements of Kurds, including North London. For indigenous minorities, the development of political organisations represents at least the desire for autonomy and, usually, independence. Numerous examples of such organisations have existed throughout Europe since 1945 including the SNP and the Vlaams Block, amongst non-violent groupings, and ETA and the IRA, of those prepared to use any means to fulfil their objectives.

Political ethnicity becomes possible with the backing of an ethnic media and the stereotypes which it perpetuates. In many parts of Europe this would encompass the development of newspapers in the language of the grouping in that area, such as the Basque land or Catalonia, or Northern Ireland. Such groups can also develop a national myth through their media, even though they do not have their own nation-states. In other instances, such as gypsies, the lack of literacy hinders the development of political ethnicity.

Ultimately, exclusion of minorities is inevitable as long as state control by dominant populations and their artificial cultures continues. All minorities experience persecution in all nation-states and their position is incompatible with nationalism. In short, if nation-states did not exist neither would minorities. Both are inevitable products of modernity, of the industrial process and the classes which it produces to control and maintain the efficient system of production. In essence, minorities are an irritant to the system of industrialization and its necessary ideology nation-

alism because they cannot be standardised as easily as people who have the characteristics typical in the dominant population of a particular state. The aim of each individual nationalism, whose possible varieties and numbers are endless, is to standardise all citizens in the territory which it controls and to exploit and victimise those which it cannot standardise. Inevitably, those who speak different languages or practice different religions will oppose such processes. The only way in which they can effectively do this is to politicise themselves by joining a national movement opposing the dominant state, although by creating such movements minorities inevitably lose some of their own distinct characteristics. The choices for minorities in postwar Europe therefore consist of becoming victims of assimilation or exploitation or, alternatively, politicizing themselves. The nature of the excluding nation-state leaves them with no other alternatives.

Czechoslovakia in Transition:
Migration Before and After the ›Velvet Divorce‹

By Frank W. Carter

Introduction[1]

The events of the late 1980's have brought independence and the promise of democracy to Eastern Europe. They have also led to the re-appearance of sovereign nation-states to the area, but this process has been accompanied by a new period of uncertainty and insecurity. An understanding of what democracy really stands for is still in its infancy in many of these countries, and communist viewpoints linger on amongst some of their inhabitants. The fear of instability in the former Soviet Union and doubts attached to their own economic reform attempts, have produced some nervousness about the future in countries now designated as the new East European democracies. Inevitably, such a volatile situation has created the possibility of substantial population movement by various migrants escaping the threats of oppression, civilian conflict or merely material deprivation. Moreover, the numerical appearance of considerable exiles from neighbouring states creates problems of internal strain and insecurity within the host country.[2]

The demise of communism and subsequent rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe after 1989 did not go unnoticed in Czechoslovakia, as evidenced by the Czech-Slovak split in January 1993. On January 1st 1993, Central Europe witnessed the creation of a new state frontier across part of its territory. The Czechoslovakian election results of June 1992 highlighted the growing popularity of national revival and separatism, even though the relation of Czech to Slovak voters who resented

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1   Unfortunately, owing to technical reasons, some of the diacritical marks from the Czech, Slovakian and Polish letters had to be omitted.

2   House of Commons, Central and Eastern Europe: Problems of the Post-Communist Era, First Report, Vol. 1, (Foreign Affairs Committee) H.M.S.O., 1992, p. VII–XV; J. Salt/J.A. Clarke, International migration in Central and Eastern Europe, in: New Community, 22. 1996, no. 3, pp. 513–529.

such a split was 1:3.[3] The ensuing euphoria over independence that many Czechs and Slovaks experienced six months later was encompassed in the peaceful so-called ›Velvet Divorce‹. The new frontier, which followed the former boundary line between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, now divides the cultural entities of two states with different demographic behaviour and cherished values.

Furthermore, a differing historical legacy has emphasised this division. The roots of Czech industrialization grew under a capitalist system dating from the mid-nineteenth century and this part of former Czechoslovakia was more easily able to re-adapt to changing economic conditions after the fall of communism; in Slovakia the centralized Soviet planning system had left the country with many useless in-dustries and large-scale unemployment. This division has accentuated differing modernisation rates between the two new states; Slovakia possesses a lower degree of urbanisation, literacy and political culture than their Czech counterparts, but a much stronger presence of communal bonds, family ties and religious beliefs.

Three years after the creation of this new frontier, Slovak euphoria is now being tempered by the simultaneous challenges of building a market economy, develop-ing a pluralist democracy, and forging a new cultural identity. The separatist Slovak rhetoric about the vast reservoirs of national energy that would be released merely through the achievement of independence has been replaced by a more realistic assessment of the future.

It is perhaps also opportune in this context to ask if the attitudes of migrants to borderland regions of former communists states have in any way changed over the last half decade. This paper will provide a case study of the East Slovakian region, an area which may potentially form part of the eastern extremity in an enlarged European Union. Solving migration problems in this portion of former Czecho-slovakia may depend on whether migrants' perception of the region is seen as holding a »peripheral edge function«, or as having the future potential to become a »centre of attraction«.[4]

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3   P. Mareš/L. Musil/L. Rabušic, Vox Populi, Vox Dei? Trends Towards Post-Totalita-rianism, First European Conference of Sociology, 26.–29.8.1992, Vienna 1993, p. 7; O. Dedek, The Break Up of Czechoslovakia: An In-depth Economic Analysis, Aldershot 1996.

4   J.V. Minghi, Political borderlands: peripheral edges or centres of attraction?, in: Quaderni del dottorato di ricerca in Geografia Politica, no. 2, Trieste/Naples 1993, pp. 1–8.

Certainly, the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and emergence of new democratic states in Eastern Europe has had an effect on both the pressure to migrate and geographical patterns of migration. The rekindling of old ethnic conflicts in recent years has revived public interest in nationalist problems. Areas like the Czech and Slovak Republics have shifted towards the centre of political discussion providing an overpowering feeling of history repeating itself. Analogies may exist between nineteenth century nationalist movements and contemporary nationalism in Eastern Europe, but there is one major difference. Earlier changes were not accompanied by a social revolution and the ascending bourgeoisie, once in power, accepted the ›status quo‹.

Now the whole social system has been rejected and the new class leaders are deprived of old conventions, concocting often new, untried principles, which could have risky results. Such a situation creates uncertainty amongst some sections of a country's population, which in turn consider migration if they feel threatened. Migration within former Czechoslovakia is only part of a complex framework of movement prevailing throughout much of the European continent. Political and/or economic tension there may have fundamental effects on people's decisions to move, whilst greater stability could encourage them to stay.

Internal Migration

In the former Czechoslovakia population migration was defined domestically as a change in place of residence. The most intensive types of migration took place for reasons of work and service provision. Characteristically, basic information on migration was only available from the state statistical office's registration of destination. While this registration process recorded every migration move, little attention was paid to migration behaviour. Each registration form included data on a migrant's gender, employment, employer, income source, family status, education, nationality, reason for migration, together with his/her past and present place of residence. The Czechoslovakian Statistical Office annually published information on basic registration data in an amalgamated form, usually at the administrative province level. In many West European countries, population census material is often utilized as another migration data source, but unfortunately throughout the postwar period in former Czechoslovakia, such censuses did not ask any questions on migration, earlier place(s) of residence, or birthplace. A question on birthplace was only introduced for the first time in the March 1991 population census. Thus,

for much of the postwar period, analysis of the migration process could only be done at a very elementary level.

Irrespective of these data weaknesses evidence suggests there was considerable movement between the Czech Lands and Slovakia for the 1961–1989 period. First, clear migration differences existed in intensity between the Czech Lands and Slovakia at province level.[5] Secondly, over the three decades there was clearly some decline in migration movement. By 1950, there was a need for immigrants from Slovakia to help fill the vacuum left by German expellees and the demands of an intensive industrial/mining development programme in the Czech Lands. Slovakia was also industrializing, which accounted for migration movement between the two areas. This early impetus had abated somewhat by 1960 and was to continue over the ensuing years so that by 1989 migration between the two areas only reached a third of the 1950 level. However, the net gain throughout the period remained with the Czech Lands. Thirdly, the economy of former Czechoslovakia was predominantly extensive in character until the early 1960s especially in industry; this resulted in large new metallurgical, engineering and chemical plants being constructed to provide a basis for other industrial and economic development.[6] During the 1960s and 1970s more intensive economic development took place which was reflected in the migration process. As a result, the annual average size of migration between provinces gradually decreased the trend continuing during the 1980s.[7]

Fourthly, Prague, (the capital) remained consistently the most attractive migrant destination throughout the whole period. Fifthly, as early as the 1960s the attractiveness of coal-mining areas was reflected in net migration, especially to the Ostrava region. This trend was later reversed in the 1980s leading to out-migration

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5   M. Kucera, Populace Ceské Republiky 1918–1991, in: Acta Demographica, no. 12 (Ceské Demografická Spolecnost) Sociologický Ústav, Akademie Ved Ceské Republiky, Prague 1994, p. 144, Table 108; V. Srb, Demografické úbytky Ceskoslovenska 1948–1990 v dusledku ilegálních odchodu z republiky, in: Statistika, no. 4, 1990, pp. 171–172; Z. Cermák, Internal Migration in the Czech Republic during period of transition, in: Acta Facultatis Rerum Naturalium Comenianae: Geographica, 37. 1996, pp. 122–130.

6   F.W. Carter, Czechoslovakia, in: A.H. Dawson (ed.), Planning in Eastern Europe, 1987, pp. 103–137.

7   M. Hampl/K. Kühnl, Migratory trends in former Czechoslovakia, in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Geographica, 28. 1993, no. 1, pp. 53–71; N. Cattan/C. Grasland, Migrations et effets de barrière en Tchécoslovaquie (1960-1989), in: V. Rey, (ed.), Transition, Fragmentation, Recomposition, La Tchéco-Slovaquie en 1992, Fontenay-St. Cloud 1994, p. 97–120.

from mining areas in decline; North Bohemia was the main exception thanks to the development of uranium mining. Sixthly, Bratislava, Slovakia's largest city (and present capital) retained its migrant appeal for the whole period.[8] Finally, during the whole 1961–1989 period, migration was predominantly from east to west in the country, namely from provinces with a high (East and Central Slovakia) to those with a low natural population increase (Central and East Bohemia).

Post-1989 changes throughout Eastern Europe have led to a reappraisal of the labour market, fuelled by increasing unemployment at home and the dislike of foreign workers filling local job vacancies. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that temporary labour migration still exists between the East European states themselves. Opportunities for employment in neighbouring former communist states, though not as attractive as jobs in the West, were still being undertaken, particularly in the more labour intensive sectors such as mining, construction and textile manufacture. Much of the push motive for this situation was the rising trend of unemployment at home, due to the effects of economic reform programmes and the role of privatisation. The magnitude of unemployment and its rapid growth rate after 1989 came as a shock both to the public and authorities in the new East European democracies. To them the irony is even more acute when they saw that so much needed to be done. Already there was a realization that the battle against unemployment could not be won purely by allocating benefits.[9]

Within the Czech Republic, internal migration was largely characterized by rural-to-urban movement. According to the 1991 census nearly a third (29.5%) of the migrants were living in a different district to that of their birth, with the average age of both in- and out-migrants then around 44 years.[10] Migration was particularly

8   A. Bezák, Migracné toky a regionálna Štruktúra Slovenska: hierarchická regionalizácia, in: Geografický Casopis, 43. 1991, no. 3, pp. 193–202; P. Podolák, Interregional migration pattern in Slovakia: Efficiency analysis and demographic consequences, in: Geoforum, 26. 1995, no. 10, pp. 65–74.

9   A. Teague, International: Unemployment provision in the former communist countries, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, 1. 1992, no. 2, pp. 23–29.

10   Š. Ocovský, Populacné a ekonomické dôsledky migrácii medzi Slovenskou a Ceskou re-publikou, in: idem./A. Volná (eds.), Populacné zdroje regionálneho rozvoja Slovenska, (SŠDS a SGS), Bratislava, 1993, pp. 73–81; N. Cattan/C. Grasland/S. Rehák, Migration flows between the Czech and Slovak Republics – which form of transition?, in: F.W.Carter/P. Jordan/V. Rey (eds.), Central Europe after the Fall of the Iron Curtain: Geopolitical Perspectives, Spatial Patterns and Trends, Frankfurt a.M. u.a. 1996, p. 319–336; K. Kühnl/Z. Cermák, Some features of the long-term development of migration in

strong towards Prague, districts north of the capital and the peripheral areas around major urban centres. Inhabitants of districts located near the German and Austrian frontiers, such as those in the provinces of Western and Southern Bohemia and Southern Moravia were often engaged in trans-frontier commuting, or benefited from the rapid growth of private enterprise initiatives. This is reflected in the fact that the Ceské Budejovice district became a major growth pole area. In Moravia, Brno, its largest city also evidenced strong in-migration. Out-migration appears to have been greatest in the inner rural districts and those areas suffering from environmental degradation, especially the North Bohemian and the Ostrava-Karviná coal basins. In Slovakia, the strongest was towards Bratislava and the urbanised areas of central and western regions (provinces).[11]

Table 1: Migration across the Czech frontier 1990–1993

	1990	1991	1992	1993
From Czech Republic	7,674	7,324	6,823	7,232
Males	3,861	3,758	3,471	3,706
Females	3,813	3,566	3,352	3,526
From Slov. Republic	10,073	8,334	11,740	7,276
Males	5,444	4,614	6,343	3,841
Females	4,629	3,720	5,397	3,435

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic 1994, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, (VEDA Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences), Bratislava 1995, Table III. 2–14, p. 136; M. Kucera, Populacní vývoj Ceské Republiky 1994 (Katedra demografie a geodemografie), Prírodovedecká fakulta, Univerzita Karlova, Prague 1994, p. 52, Table 31.

As to the migration between the Czech Lands and Slovakia during the early 1990s several points may be noted. First, emigration from Slovakia to the Czech lands in 1990 was higher than in the late 1980s (e.g. 5,926 in 1989) perhaps resulting from a perceived increase of economic opportunities in the latter region. Secondly, perhaps disillusionment with this belief led to a drop in Slovakian emigration levels in

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the Czech Republic, in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Geographica, 30. 1995, no. 1–2, pp. 71–93.

[11] D. Drbohlav/J. Blazek, Typologie a podmínenost migrace obyvatelstva podle okresu Ceské republiky na pozadí socialnegeografického prostredí, in: Sborník Ceské geografické spolecnosti, 97. 1992, no. 3, pp. 209–235.

1991, but still higher than the late 1980s. Thirdly, in 1992 it rose again, perhaps encouraged by the threat of pending separation into two independent republics. Fourthly, emigration from the Czech lands to Slovakia remained fairly constant over the whole period. Fifthly, more males than females migrated across the border especially from Slovakia for each year. Sixthly, the impact of the ›Velvet Divorce‹ in 1993 is clearly visible with a net difference between the two new republics of only 44 persons, with the balance in favour of Slovak emigrants to the Czech Republic, notably females.

In the former Czechoslovakia, a wide gap in unemployment levels has developed since 1989; in the Czech Republic it was only about 4%, but in Slovakia it became much higher.[12] After 1989 unemployment levels increased considerably in Slovakia.[13]

In December 1990, just under 40,000 people were unemployed in Slovakia. At that time its 1.5% unemployment rate totalled a third of all those registered as unemployed in former Czechoslovakia. This figure is in sharp contrast to the total of more than 300,000 a year later and involved every eighth person of the active population in December, 1991. After a slight decrease until the end of 1992 unemployment grew substantially in 1993 (nearly 370,000 or 14.5%) and remained at that level during 1994.[14]

Clearly in Slovakia, the process of transformation towards a market economy led to industrial recession, the upheaval of the privatization process, entrepreneurial development and general economic restructuring. This quickly induced an increase in unemployment and a growth of many other social problems. Several reasons may be forwarded to explain differences in Slovakia's regional unemployment pat-

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[12]   M. Kapl, Unemployment and Market-oriented Reform in Czechoslovakia, in: International Labor Review, 2. 1991, pp. 199–210; M. Olexa, Labour Force Survey in the Slovak Republic, in: Statistics in Transition, 1. 1994, no. 4, pp. 509–513.

[13]   P. Danek/R. Kvet, Tschechoslowakei oder Tschechische Republik und Slowakische Republik?, in: Geographische Rundschau, 45. 1993, no. 3, pp. 160–165; J. Ham/J. Svejnar/K. Turrell, The Czech and Slovak Labour Markets during the Transition, in: S. Commander/F. Coricelli (eds.), Unemployment, Restructuring and the Labour Market in East Europe and Russia, Washington, DC 1995, pp. 14–25.

[14]   Source: Štatistické výsledky o nezamestnanosti v Slovenskej republike. Správa sluzieb zamestnanosti za roky 1990–1994 (MPSVR SR), Bratislava 1994.

tern. Amongst them was the restructuring of the armaments industry[15], loss of former communist eastern markets and an adverse demographic structure in some Slovakian districts. These factors were further aggravated by inadequate infrastructure facilities, including poor transport or telecommunications services in many areas of the republic. Together, all these ingredients acted as a brake on attracting the input of foreign capital.[16]

Two obvious spatial factors linked Slovakia's regional unemployment structure with ethnic minorities and migration. First, there was a marked difference in unemployment rates in metropolitan as opposed to non-metropolitan districts; secondly, there was a distinct contrast between Slovakia's central and peripheral districts. Unfortunately however, Slovakia's regional unemployment pattern was more complex than this and cannot be analysed purely on population size or locational accessibility.[17] Other factors come into play, including the significant roles rendered by population structure (e.g. percentage of Romany Gypsies in the population), industrial mix, level of infrastructure, amount of environmental degradation and the overall degree of socio-economic development.[18]

Districts with low unemployment levels appeared to be located in two main areas, namely the West Slovakian province (Bratislava, Senica, Trnava and Trencin) and more extensively in the Central Slovakian province (Banská Bystrica, Liptovský Mikuláš, Martin, Poprad, Stará L'ubovna, Zvolen, Ziar nad Hronom and Zilina). Territorially, these districts coincided with areas having a high Slovak ethnic presence. Only Košice city-district in the East Slovakian province enjoyed a low level of unemployment. Elsewhere throughout the republic higher unemployment rates were often found in districts with a larger non-Slovak ethnic population. Such districts have suffered relatively more interference from new reconstruction programmes, liquidation of certain industrial assets, ambiguous ideas on agricul-

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15   A. Smith, Uneven development and the restructuring of the armaments industry in Slovakia, in: Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 19. 1994, no. 1, pp. 404–424.

16   E. Mikelka, Integrácia Slovenska do európskej a svetovej ekonomiky, in: Ekonomický Casopis, 43. 1995, no. 7–8, pp. 635–667.

17   A. Bezák, Regional unemployment in Slovakia, 1991–1993: some preliminary findings, paper presented at the Scientific Session, 50th Anniversary of the Institute of Geography, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, September 1994.

18   Z. Komínková, Regionálne dôsledky prvého roku ekonomickej transformácie a predpoklady rozvoja regiónov Slovenskej republiky, in: Ekonomický Casopis, 40. 1992, no. 6, pp. 454–468.

tural development and indecision on the future role of cooperative farms; these factors have resulted in large regional differences in unemployment rates at district level. Another factor also contributed to varied unemployment levels, namely the complicated demographic and ethnic structure in some Slovakian districts. For example, high unemployment existed in the Rimavská Sobota and Roznava districts; it so happens that these districts contained a large percentage of Romany Gypsies, or 6.8% and 7.2% respectively. According to Slovakian sources, this ethnic group suffers from low levels of educational achievement and poor attitudes to employment. Romany Gypsies constituted over three-fifths (60%) of the total unemployment figure in the Roznava, Rimavská Sobota, Vel'ký Krtíš and Spišská Nova Ves districts. In some districts of the East Slovakian province, Gypsies totalled more than a quarter of those unemployed (Table 2).

Table 2: Slovakia: % Romany Gypsies of total unemployed, Dec. 1990 to Dec. 1994

Province	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Bratislava	0.03	2.60	2.30	2.90	3.10
West Slovakia	3.10	8.70	4.90	4.70	4.50
Central Slovakia	4.80	11.20	8.90	8.90	8.80
East Slovakia	8.70	30.10	29.80	29.10	26.40
Slovak Republic	4.80	15.30	14.20	13.90	13.10

Source: E. Rajcáková, The main characters of process and state of unemployment in Slovakia, Acta Facultatis Rerum Naturalium Universitatis Comenianae: Geographica, no. 34, Bratislava 1994, p. 177.

Fewer unemployment problems exist in the Czech Republic, although some regional differences did occur. These were particularly noticeable between the more economically or socially developed western provinces and their counterparts in the east. Clearly, Prague's metropolitan region stood out as the one with greatest future employment possibilities. The republic's other major regional centres tendered the best chances for employment, mainly based on greater job diversity found in the larger Czech cities. Regionally, Bohemia's coal-mining districts still offered considerable employment opportunities, in spite of predictions for the pending decline of future production. Elsewhere, highest employment opportunities were found in the Karlovy Vary district, thanks to its excellent location near the German border, spa tourism development and continued shortage of hired labour. In contrast,

Moravia's southern districts suffered higher unemployment figures (e.g. from Jihlava in the west to Breclav in the east), in spite of their favourable location near the Austrian border and proximity to Vienna. This situation arose due to over-production in agriculture and a building industry slump, both the results of economic change during the post-1989 period.

In the former Czechoslovakia an odd concept arose over universal human rights. Prior to the ›Velvet Divorce‹ in 1993, it was clear that a person had the right to migrate from say Prague to Bratislava, or vice versa, without any problems. This situation was to change after January 1st 1993, when new national citizenship laws came into force. After that date migration activity was restricted, because it now related to movement between nation-states.[19] Another idiosyncrasy in this situation concerned the right of a nation-state to restrict entry to its territory. The borders of nation-states are the result of historical accidents and therefore subject to change. In the case of former Czechoslovakia, it would seem that existing entry rights either had to be reduced or expanded. The only way to bring a logical coherence to the treatment of a person's right to migrate was either to remove all privileges, or add the missing prerogative, namely that of immigration.

Moreover, Slovakia's split from the Czech Republic in January 1993 threw its economy badly out of balance after Bratislava's planners underestimated the economic cost of the ›Velvet Divorce‹. Following independence, Slovakia faced enormous economic difficulties connected with the transition process. These have been related to the consequences of political division, the unfavourable inherited industrial structures and the problem of converting former military-based industries to peace-time conditions. All this has resulted in the creation of high unemployment rates. By the end of 1993, nearly 370,000 individuals were registered as without work, equal to a seventh of the possible active employment numbers and a ninefold increase on the December 1990 figure. Towards the end of 1994 there had been a slight improvement, but if one includes hidden unemployment figures, the total remained around 30%.[20] The latest official figures give the unemployment rate as 13% for 1996 (Table 7).

19   B. Sutcliffe, Migration, rights and illogic, in: Index on Censorship, 23. 1994, no. 3, pp. 27–37.

20   I. Okáli/H. Gabrielová/E. Hlavatý/R. Outrata, Economic Development of Slovakia in 1994: Study elaborated on behalf of the European Economic Commission of the UN, in: Ekonomický Časopis, 43. 1995, no. 3, pp. 175–204; G. Brhlovic, Analýza vývoja zamest-

Part of these changes was related to a failure on the part of the Czechoslovak and later Slovak Republic to provide an overall effective regional unemployment policy during the period 1990–1995. This was to have disastrous effects on regional unemployment. At a regional level, specific examples of rapid unemployment increase have been experienced in the Cadca district of West Slovakia province, where a fifth (20.2%) of the active population are without work (including ethnic Poles), and the adjacent district of Dolný Kubín (17.4%). These high unemployment figures resulted from the ›transfer‹ (resettlement) of former male employees in North Moravia's Ostrava region in the Czech Republic. Besides these districts others with high unemployment rates between 1990–1994 included some with large Hungarian minorities, e.g. Dunajská Streda (17.4%), Rimavská Sobota (14.7%), and to a lesser extent Komárno, Roznava and Veľký Krtiš. Elsewhere, ethnic Poles living around Košice in the East Slovakia province also suffered high unemployment, e.g. Košice-rural (16.5%). Other districts with a less dominant ethnic group but high unemployment included Nitra (16.9%). Therefore, during the post-1989 period considerable out-migration of various ethnic groups from these particular districts occurred. The strongest out-migration in Slovakia has been from the economically poorer eastern region, towards Bratislava and urban districts in the central and western provinces.[21] Externally, once the initial shock of political separation had been overcome, emigration from Slovakia to the Czech Republic increased again in 1994 and totalled some 3,144 persons; this compared with 4,076 people arriving in Slovakia from the Czech republic.

A particularly sensitive situation has arisen over the Romany Gypsies, which has made it more difficult for them to qualify for Czech citizenship. The former Czechoslovakian attitude to the Romany population, the majority of whom lived in Slovakia (53%), has given rise to some concern. They live in overcrowded housing conditions, have a high rate of illiteracy (a third), and lack vocational training opportunities.[22] Almost 400,000 Romanies lived in former Czechoslovakia, and it has

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nanosti a nezamestnanosti v rokoch 1990–1993 v Slovenskej republike, in: Ekonomický Casopis, 42. 1994, no. 11, pp. 842–857; P. Mariot, Koncentrácia a Štruktúra zamestnanosti ako podklad regionalizácie územia Slovenskej republiky, in: Sborník Ceské geografické spolecnosti, no. 3, Prague 1991, pp. 113–126.

21   D. Drbohlav/J. Blazek, Typologie a podmínenost migrace.

22   O. Ulc, Gypsies in Czechoslovakia: A Case of Unfinished Integration, in: East European Politics and Societies, 2. 1988, no. 2, pp. 306–332.

been estimated that their combined total in the two new republics will reach between 550–600,000 by the end of this century.[23]

Their future is by no means certain given the present political situation. In the Czech Republic, most present-day Romany Gypsies had previously lived in Slovakia. Under communism many were encouraged to move to western parts of the country often to fill population vacuums created by the expulsion of German residents. Even before the establishment of the new Czech Republic, however, many Czech towns tried to introduce bye-laws preventing the settlement of Romany-born Gypsies wishing to migrate from the eastern parts of former Czechoslovakia.

Their situation is more difficult in Slovakia. The 1993 Czech law stated that if a person, or his/her parents, was born in Slovakia, they now had to officially apply for Czech citizenship. Moreover, the bestowal of Czech citizenship carried with it various stipulations. For example, in order to be successful, a potential applicant had to satisfactorily pass a Czech language test, provide evidence of permanent residence in the Czech Republic during the previous two years and not have any criminal record over the preceding five years. This latter prerequisite was particularly abhorrent, considering that the five year limit reverted back to communist times. This meant that convictions could be counted for crimes which were no longer legally part of the current statute books; such misdeeds included being self-employed (i.e. defined as »living a parasitic life«), or being a spinster dwelling in her parent's residence.[24] Furthermore, if refused Czech citizenship, even though they were born in the Czech Republic, Romany Gypsies did not automatically qualify for Slovak citizenship. In the new Europe therefore, many Czech-born Romany Gypsies may well become stateless persons. Thus the question arises of what will happen to them, if they are forced to migrate and where will they go? Here is a potential migration exodus in the making. If Western Europe will not give them sanctuary, then Hungary and Poland seem obvious outlets, or even perhaps the former lands of Yugoslavia, now that peace has been restored. On the contrary, a glimmer of hope has occurred in the Spisská Nova Ves district of Slovakia where a

23   Anon, Periodical on Problems of the Gypsy population in Czechoslovakia, in: Information from Czechoslovakia, 27. 1989, Prague, pp. 22–25.

24   D. Kenrick, Minorities: Romani. On the move once more, in: Index on Censorship, 23. 1994, no. 3, pp. 67–70.

European Community PHARE programme has helped to fund a new housing estate for the Romany population in the village of Nálepkovo.[25]

International Migration

Prior to 1989, migration through temporary labour agreements between the various East European Soviet satellites persisted, if not on a large scale. Continual manpower shortages and the availability of cheap labour from less-developed communist states as Vietnam and Cuba proved, as in many other East European socialist states, a most attractive proposition.[26] The former Czechoslovakian government was one of the largest employers of these guest workers; for example, of the 120,000 Poles employed in Eastern Europe, 36% worked in Czechoslovakia.

One of the main reasons for this situation was the serious haemorrhaging of the Czechoslovakian population through emigration abroad. Between 1948 and 1989 Czechoslovakia lost over half a million inhabitants who moved abroad, either legally (65,000) or illegally (500,000); this gave an annual migration loss of 13,500 (i.e. a fifth of natural increase for this period).[27]

In 1990, the Czechoslovakian government also made emergency plans for the three million Soviet immigrants expected over the next twelve months. We now know that the 1990 forecast of a multitude of Soviet refugees storming into Eastern Europe, driven by hunger and increasing anarchy at home, did not materialise. Ironically, a much diminished threat came that year from temporary asylum given to more than 400 Romanians, along with Kurds, Bulgarians, Soviet soldiers not wishing to return home, and 90 Albanians who arrived via the Czechoslovak embassy in Tirana.[28] In fact, the greatest danger for Eastern Europe was to come from growing xenophobia and ethnic clashes fuelled by economic competition.

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25   Anon, EU support for Romany housing experiment, in: Newsletter; British Czech and Slovak Association, 28. 1995, p. 9.

26   H. Reed, Foreign workers in Eastern Europe, in: Report on Eastern Europe, 1. 1990, no. 27 (Radio Free Europe), pp. 48–52.

27   M. Kucera, Populace Ceské Republiky 1918–1991, in: Acta Demographica, 12 (Ceské Demografická Spolecnost), Sociologický Ústav, Akademie Ved Ceské Republiky, Prague 1994, p. 145.

28   F.W. Carter, The Economic and Demographic Development of Albania since 1945, in: L. di Comite/M.A. Valeri (eds.), Problemi demo-economici dell'Albania, Bari 1994, pp. 47–48.

Besides migration within former Czechoslovakia, greatest concern there was linked with small national minority groups connected with former Soviet territory, or living in other Central-East European countries and wishing to return to their newly emerged state. The Ruthenians in Eastern Slovakia proved a case in point, with the belief that some may have wished to migrate to Trans-Carpathian Ukraine; similarly Russians, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians in former Yugoslavia could have desires on asylum in former Czechoslovakia. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, some movement of small ethnic groups was anticipated trying to return to their respective countries. For example, there were 20,000 Slovaks and 2,000 Czechs in Poland, whilst in former Yugoslav lands there were modest numbers of Czechs and Slovaks. Their potential migration, though insignificant, was seen as a possibility. Less likely to return home were the »thousands of Romanians in Czechoslovakia«[29], some of whom were of Romany origin. Tensions still remain between the Czechs and descendants of 2 million Sudeten Germans over property rights in western Bohemia.[30]

The Slovak Hungarians were and remain a more serious case. In the past, Hungary had quarrelled with former Czechoslovakia over its 600,000-strong minority in Slovakia. Following fairly harmonious relations up to 1960, the Hungarian Slovaks noted a change in government attitudes towards them after that date. This resulted in attempts at assimilation; first, administrative changes left them with a majority in only two districts (Dunajská Streda and Komárno) in the Danube valley; secondly, educational changes placed emphasis on loyalty to the Czechoslovakian state, and thirdly, Hungarians were pressurised into learning the Slovak language. Reversal of these decrees after 1968 did little to convince the Hungarian minority of any improvement in their conditions; throughout the 1980's they maintained to be subject to discrimination. By early 1992, their position became precarious and untenable once more as the fragile marriage between the Czech and Slovak federal states was approaching inevitable divorce. Once realized, it was suggested that the insecurity felt by many Slovak Hungarians would encourage them to cross the

29   H. Reed, Foreign Workers, p. 52; D. Drbohlav, Ceskà Republika a mezinàrodní imigrace, in: M. Hampl (ed.), Geografické organizace spolecnosti a transformacní procesy v ceské republice, Prírodovedecká fakulty, Univerzity Karlovy, Prague, 1996, pp. 199–218; T. Warner, Czech Republic: Migration to the Middle Ground, in: Transition, 14.7.1995, Prague, pp. 26–32.

30   N.M. Wingfield, Czech-Sudeten German relations in light of the ›Velvet Revolution‹: Post-Communist interpretations, in: Nationalities Papers, 24. 1996, no. 1, pp. 93–106; Anon, Sudeten German saga nears end, in: The Times, 18.1.1997, p. 5.

Danube and join their co-nationals in their homeland, but these worst fears were not to materialize.

Table 3: Foreign Migration to and from Slovakia, 1990–1993

	1990	1991	1992	1993*
From abroad	944	1,752	2,106	1,874
Males	552	1,011	1,154	982
Females	392	741	952	892
To abroad	867	527	128	79
Males	418	290	58	32
Females	449	237	70	47

* excluding Czech Republic.

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, (VEDA, Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences), Bratislava 1995, p. 136.

Firstly, if one includes immigration from the Czech Republic there appears a remarkable increase (total: 9,106 – see Table 1) of in-migration to the Slovak Republic after the ›Velvet Divorce‹ of January 1993, but in reality if the Czech immigrants are excluded then there is a clear migration decline of all categories in Slovakia over 1992 totals. Secondly, there was generally a predominance of male over female migrants, except in 1990, 1992 and 1993 were small inexplicable female gains occurred. Thirdly, the rise in immigration after 1990 could be related to the attraction of Slovakia as a potential ›backdoor‹ route for foreign migrants into the EU and/or as a safe haven for refugees, especially from Balkan turmoil.

After the ›Velvet Divorce‹ it was becoming increasingly obvious that the Czech Republic was developing into a country of immigration. A buoyant economy attracted many potential immigrants although there has been some stalling progress against problems of inflation.

Table 4:   Economy of the Czech Republic, 1993–1997

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997*
GDP Growth (%)	0.0	2.6	4.8	5.5	4.3
Indust. Output (%)	-2.7	2.5	9.2	8.0	5.0
Unemployment(%)	3.5	3.2	2.9	3.3	4.0
Inflation (%)	17.9	10.3	7.9	8.5	8.0

* Estimate.

Source: IMF/EBRD/OECD/Eastern Europe Monitor, 3. 1996, no. 10, p. 4.

There had been a growing trend of out-migration by Czech nationals from Slovakia since 1991. According to the 1991 former Czechoslovakian census, Slovakia contained about 42,000 ethnic Czechs, who formed a major part of the republic's 53,000 Czech citizens. It was assumed that after the ›Velvet Divorce‹, diverse non-Czech citizens residing in Slovakia would wish to join their relatives or families living in the Czech Republic. This group also included people wishing to apply for and hopefully be granted a Czech residency permit e.g. asylum seekers. It was also believed that some Czech re-immigration from elsewhere – Western Europe or North America – would also swell in-migration numbers. Two immigration forecasts were made, one based on a positive migration balance of some 2,000 persons a year, and the other on a surplus of 4,200 to 4,500 persons annually. Results from the analysis of these two variants suggested that immigrants would add either 29–31,000, or 65–67,000 persons to the total Czech population by the year 2005.[31]

Clearly by 1993 it was increasingly apparent that the Czech Republic would not become a country of emigration. It was now hardly likely that political emigration from the Czech Republic would occur on any large scale, while destination countries (e.g. ›Fortress Europe‹) would discourage economic emigration. Exceptions to this rule could occur amongst females migrating as a result of marriage to a foreigner, or older individuals leaving to rejoin their families abroad.

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[31]   B. Burcin/M. Kucera/T. Kucera, Population perspectives of the Czech Republic, in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Geographica, 28. 1993, no. 1, pp. 15–29; Z. Cermák, Transformacní procesy a migracní vývoj v Ceské republice, in: M. Hampl (ed.), Geografické organizace spolecnosti a transformacní procesy v Ceské republice, Prírodovedecká fakulty, Univerzity Karlovy, Prague 1996, pp. 179–197.

Foreign nationals (excluding Slovaks) have also been attracted to the Czech Republic, enamoured by its higher standard of living and potential European Union membership.

Table 5:   Foreign nationals acquiring Czech citizenship 1993–1994

Country of Origin	Total	%
All Countries	2,881	100.0
Russian Federation	687	23.8
USA	72	2.5
Greece	645	22.4
Ukraine	488	16.9
Bulgaria	365	12.7
Romania	28	1.0
Poland	357	12.4
Former Yugoslavia	55	1.9
Other	184	6.4

Source: Informace o migraci na území Ceské Republiky za rok 1994, (Reditelství cizinecké a pohranicní policie), Prague 1994, p. 11.

The table clearly illustrates the attraction of the Czech Republic for former communist-bloc states, who between them contain over two-thirds (68.7%) of the total. The Russian Federation heads the list with nearly a quarter, whilst the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Poland together provide over two-fifths (42%); Romania and the former Yugoslavia are less significant. American immigrants are probably from, or descended from, Czech families who emigrated to the New World after 1945. Over a fifth were from Greece, presumably attracted by the growing economic opportunities to be found in the Czech Republic.

Table 6:   Illegal immigrants caught entering the Czech Republic in 1993–1994

Country of Origin	Total	%
All Countries	20,480	100.0
Former Yugoslavia	9,648	47.1
Bulgaria	2,380	11.6
Romania	1,299	6.3
Czech Republic	1,648	8.0
Former GDR	797	3.9
Poland	795	3.9
Tunisia	486	2.4
Slovakia	534	2.6
Other	2,893	14.2

Source: Informace o migraci na území Ceské Republiky za rok 1994, (Reditelství cizinecké a pohranicní policie), Prague 1994, p. 15.

In contrast, about seven times more immigrants tried to enter the Czech Republic illegally. Four-fifths (83.4%) of the illegal immigrants originated from former communist-bloc countries. Understandably, nearly half came from war-torn former Yugoslavia; nearly another fifth (17.9%) appeared from Romania and Bulgaria, whilst a similar percentage (18.4%) arrived from Poland, the former GDR, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the latter possibly employed in some form of subversive (criminal?) activity. Some of these illegal immigrants, particularly from countries like Tunisia, may have been aiming to use the Czech Republic as a ›backdoor‹ for entrance into the European Union via Germany or Austria. In comparison to the Czech Republic, Slovakia faces a long list of problems both domestically and abroad, aggravated by a power struggle between its prime minister and president, which have done little to improve its economy.

Table 7:   Economy of Slovakia, 1993–1997

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997*
GDP Growth (%)	-4.1	4.9	7.4	5.5	3.5
Indust. Output (%)	-5.4	7.1	8.4	3.0	3.5
Unemployment (%)	14.8	14.8	13.1	13.0	12.5
Inflation (%)	23.2	11.7	7.2	6.0	7.0

* Estimate; source: IMF/EBRD/OECD/Eastern European Monitor, 3. 1996, no. 10, p. 5.

In general, it is possible to say that in the 1990's population growth or loss due to migration has declined considerably compared to the 1980s. Nevertheless, despite a general decline in migratory movement, the proportion of migrants moving short distances continues to increase. The greatest obstacle to higher territorial mobility of the labour force at present in Slovakia is the under-developed housing market and the very low number of flats completed and taken into use in the 1990's together with high prices. In order to maintain the current housing standard of 307 flats per 1,000 inhabitants, it will be necessary to build circa 97,000 flats by 2,000, or 16,000 flats per year. In 1995 only between 5-6,000 flats were built.[32]

Table 8: Migration to and from Slovakia, 1993–1994

		From abroad	From Czech Rep.	To abroad	To Czech Rep.
1993	Total	1,874	7,232	79	7,276
	Males	982	3,706	32	3,841
	Females	892	3,526	47	3,435
1994	Total	1,778	3,144	59	95
	Males	942	1,769	26	44
	Females	836	1,375	33	51
Balance 1993				1,795	-44
Balance 1994				1,719	3,049

Source: Stav a pohyb obyvatelstva SR 1993, 1994, (SR Statistical Office) Bratislava; Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, (VEDA, Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences) Bratislava 1996, Table III. 2–17, pp. 154–155.

The migration data for flows to and from the Slovak Republic was based on compulsory registration of a person's residence with the local authority. Several factors should be noted about Table 8. First, inflows of migrants from abroad (excluding the Czech Republic) totalled about 1,800 persons in both 1993 and 1994. In 1993, immigration from the Czech Republic totalled about 7,000 persons, whilst the brisk migration movement between the Slovak and Czech Republics in that year resulted from the ›Velvet Divorce‹. In 1994, immigration from the Czech Republic

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[32]   D. Jurcová, Influence of changed economic conditions on migration of population in the Slovak Republic, in: Acta Facultatis Rerum Naturalium Universitatis Comenianae: Geographica, 37. 1996, pp. 131–139; ibid., Analýza migrácie v Slovenskej republike, Študia, (INFOSTAT), Bratislava 1994, 24 pp.

decreased considerably to half the 1993 level. Secondly, emigration data is thought to be underrecorded. With greater freedom on travel abroad, intending emigrants were no longer subject to any special administrative policy. Perhaps the only reliable figures on emigration are those referring to the outflow of migrants to the Czech Republic in 1993, a consequence of the division of former CSFR. Those Czechoslovak nationals wishing to preserve their Czech nationality had to renounce their Slovak equivalent and thus the data recorded the attendant change of residence. Thirdly, while the flows of migrants to and from the Czech Republic in 1993 were almost balanced, in 1994 the balance was more positive with a net inflow of 3,000 persons. However, this fact should be interpreted with caution; it is highly likely that the recorded outflow to the Czech Republic in 1994 was underestimated, as was all the other outflows abroad, partly because there was no nationality swapping mentioned previously.

An alterative data source on migration is the central register of granted residence permits kept by the Ministry of Interior. While the annual inflows in 1993 and 1994 were slightly above 3,000 persons, the cumulative total of foreigners with long-term residence permits in the Slovak Republic reached 11,173 persons in 1995.[33]

Table 9:   Slovakia: Long-term foreign residents, 31.8.1995 (100% = 11,173)

Country of origin	Total	%
All foreigners	11,173	100,0
Austria	410	3.7
Czech Republic	1,055	9.4
Germany	474	4.2
Vietnam	624	5.6
Poland	835	7.5
Former USSR	850	7.6
Ukraine	861	7.7
USA	505	4.5
Former Yugoslavia	1,563	14.0
Others	3,996	35.8

Source: Internal Ministry of Interior data, quoted in: Z. Kostolna & E. Hanzelova, Novy fenomen na trhu prace-azylanti a migranti (Research Institute of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family), Bratislava, November 1995.

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[33]   M. Lubyová, Slovak Republic, SOPEMI Report 1995, OECD, Paris 1995, Table 6, p. 30.

First, clearly the main countries of migrant origin besides the Czech Republic are the former Yugoslavia and USSR, the Ukraine and Poland. Secondly, about two-thirds of the immigrants come from countries mentioned in Table 9, while some one hundred other states collectively provide just over a third. Thirdly, most western immigrants come from the USA, Germany, Austria, Great Britain and Italy. On a regional basis, foreigners with Slovakian long-term residence permits are mainly attracted to and located in Bratislava[34], followed by the West Slovakian region.

The question of refugees is another matter. Since January 1993 annual inflows into Slovakia had increased. Official applications for refugee status between January and September 1995 were rather constrained, rising annually from 96 (1993) via 140 (1994) to 241 in 1995, of which 38, 54 and 54 respectively were granted refugee status. These figures tend to underplay the real refugee total. Up to October 1995, refugee status was based on definitions made in an act of 1990, i.e. passed prior to the ›Velvet Divorce‹. In it definitions were too narrow to cover war migrants arriving from the Balkan traumas of the past half-decade. Prior to October 1995 in Slovakia, war refugees subjected to prejudice in their own country (for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social or political affiliation), were ineligible for refugee status. Post-October, 1995 war refugee cases have been considered more realistically on humanitarian grounds/human rights protection. For example according to UNHCR sources, in June 1996, 1,900 Bosnian refugees were living in Slovakia, with a similar number (2,000) in the Czech Republic.[35]

The question remains as to how many of them wish to stay? Numerous war refugees only view their presence in Slovakia as temporary and do not wish to obtain permanent residence. As a result, official Ministry of Interior refugee application statistics misjudge the total number living in the country. In complete contrast to Balkan refugees, Ukrainian nationals of Slovak origin and from areas influenced by the Chernobyl disaster have applied for and been granted permanent residence in Slovakia. Over the period from January 1993 to September 1995 they totalled some 168 families comprising of 407 adults and 172 children. On arrival in Slova-

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34   W. Surazska, Transition to democracy and the fragmentation of a city: Four cases of Central European Capitals, in: Political Geography, 15. 1996, no. 5, pp. 365–381.

35   Anon, Bosnia's refugees. Doors slam, in: The Economist, 28.9.1996, pp. 61f.

kia work permits were allocated to one adult per family, together with job assurance.[36]

East Slovakia: A Case Study

Economically, the East Slovakian region was always considered to be the poorest developed part of the former Czechoslovakian Republic. Even in the early 1970s it still only managed about 5% of the country's total production. There then followed a period of strong economic development, above all based on the construction of the East Slovakian Metallurgical Works at Košice, together with power plants, chemical and engineering factories and consumer goods industries in other parts of the region. Agricultural production was particularly concentrated on the East Slovakian Lowlands and the Košice Basin, where extensive drainage and soil reclamation projects were undertaken. Elsewhere new railway lines were laid, roads constructed and modern factories/settlements developed, all in an attempt to improve the region's living standards and reach levels found in other regions of the former Czechoslovakian republic.[37] Today, East Slovakia forms one of four administrative regions (kraj) in the new republic.

Table 10:   East Slovakia in relation to the Slovak Republic

Region	Capital	Area km²	Population 1990
Bratislava	–	368	444,482
West Slovakia	Bratislava	14,492	1,730,786
Central Slovakia	Banská Bystrica	17,982	1,622,380
East Slovakia	Košice	16,193	1,512,506

Source: Statistický úrad Slovenskej republiky, Bratislava 1991.

The region covers a third (33.0%) of the new republic's territory; in December, 1990 it had over a quarter (28.5%) of Slovakia's inhabitants. Košice, its regional

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36   M. Lubyová, Slovak Republic, SOPEMI Report 1995, pp. 10–11.

37   J. Demek/M. Strída, Geography of Czechoslovakia (Academia), Prague 1971, p. 191; M. Blazek, Východoslovenský kraj, in: M. Strída (ed.), Oblasti Ceskoslovenska (S.P.N.), Prague 1963, pp. 201–220.

capital (population of 234,840 in 1991) is the administrative centre for the region's 21 districts (okres) which, prior to March 1996, had totalled thirteen.**38**

With this general background to Eastern Slovakia in mind, it is now possible to turn attention to some of the main reasons for migration in the region, in a borderland area that is now an integral part of the newly created Slovakian Republic and in the not too distant future could become part of the EU's eastern frontier. Regionally, the East Slovakian region began to experience increasing unemployment in the early 1990s.

Table 11: Slovakia: Regional unemployment totals with special reference to East Slovakia (31.12.1991)

Region		Total Unemployed
West Slovakia		102,494
Central Slovakia		92,656
East Slovakia		87,289
of which:	Bardejov	6,388
	Humenné	4,509
	Košice-urban	10,592
	Košice-rural	4,603
	Michalovce	7,383
	Poprad	10,389
	Prešov	10,827
	Roznava	5,906
	Spišská Nová Ves	8,581
	Stará Lubovna	2,556
	Svidník	2,688
	Trebišov	8,340
	Vranov nad Toplou	4,527
Slovakia: Total		301,951

Source: Z. Komínková, Regionálne dôsledky prvého roku ekonomickej transformácie a predpoklady rozvoja regiónov Slovenskej republiky, Ekonomický Casopis, 40. 1992, no. 6, p. 456–457.

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38 E. Bakker, Slovakia's territorial and administrative reform: political instability and ethnic tensions, in: European Spatial Research & Policy, 2. 1995, no. 2, pp. 89–96.

First, the East Slovakian region contained 28.9% of the republic's unemployment total and secondly, unemployment was highest in the more urbanised districts like Košice-city, Poprad and Prešov. Failure on the part of the state to provide an overall effective regional unemployment policy during the period 1990–1994 also had disastrous effects on regional unemployment. Besides districts with a high percentage of Romany Gypsies in East Slovakia, others with large Hungarian minorities, e.g. Roznava, had high unemployment rates between 1990–1994. Elsewhere, e.g. in Košice-rural (16.5%), ethnic Poles living around Košice also suffered high unemployment. Other districts with a less dominant ethnic group but high unemployment, included Bardejov (18.9%), and Trebišov (16.4%). Overall therefore, it is not surprising to find that out-migration of various ethnic groups from these particular districts has occurred during the post-1989 period.

Table 12:   Slovakia: Migration, 1993–1994

Region	1993		1994	
	From Abroad	From Czech Republic	From Abroad	From Czech Republic
Bratislava	657	734	523	365
West Slovakia	402	2,151	459	1,137
Central Slovakia	313	2,359	315	806
East Slovakia	502	1,988	481	836
	To Abroad	To Czech Rep.	To Abroad	To Czech Rep.
Bratislava	1	858	1	0
West Slovakia	22	2,262	33	11
Central Slovakia	20	2,306	84	65
East Slovakia	36	1,850	36	19

Source: Stav a pohyb obyvatelstva SR 1993, 1994 (MPSVR SR) Bratislava.

First, there appears to have been a large decline in the number of migrants leaving East Slovakia for the Czech Republic between 1993–1994 from 1, 850 to 19, a trend witnessed by all regions. Secondly, immigration from abroad to East Slovakia was much higher in both years than emigration abroad. The majority of Eastern Slovakia's foreign labour force is concentrated in the two cities of Košice and Bardejov. This reflects the region's proximity to and direct border with the

Ukraine. The two above-mentioned cities host 44% of all Ukrainian employees in Slovakia. Thirdly, emigration from Slovakia to the Czech lands declined considerably, once the initial impact of political separation had taken root. Figures reveal a dramatic decrease with only 95 persons emigrating there in 1994, compared to 3,144 arriving from the Czech Republic, less than half the previous year.

Future migration patterns may also reflect regional differences. Some regions like East Slovakia, will not fare well as areas of in-migration if they suffer from adverse economic circumstances, such as a surfeit of outdated heavy industry, or remain primarily agricultural regions.[39] In contrast, those regions with extensive service sectors and a prosperous array of industrial activity, together with potential for the development of recreational facilities and international tourism, will prove a magnet for in-migration. Overall therefore, the best in-migration areas appear to be more urbanised centres, like Košice or Prešov, in contrast to the less attractive predominantly rural or peripheral localities.[40]

Finally at some as yet unknown date, there will be an expansion of the EU's frontier several hundred kilometres eastward; part of this border will then include East Slovakia's boundary with the Ukraine. Once this occurs, responsibility for policing this frontier will transfer to the Slovaks; in turn, their EU partners will have to feel confident that the eastern border is effectively controlled. Since April 1995, the political, cultural, economic and security aspects of the EU have become even more vital, with the suspension of internal border controls following the endorsement of the Schengen Accords.[41] Again such circumstances will favour Minghi's ›political edge functions‹ for a border region like East Slovakia, as opposed to his ›centre of attraction‹ characteristics.

Undoubtedly, the division of former Czechoslovakia in 1993 has added further complexity to a region like East Slovakia that is experiencing continued geopolitical

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39   M. Fáziková/K. Harceková, Transformation in Agricultural Land Use and its Influence on the Formation of the Labour Market in Slovakia, in: Acta Facultatis Rerum Naturalium Universitatis: Geographica, 37. 1996, pp. 222–228.

40   V. Baláz, Regional development during economic transition: A case study of the Slovak Republic, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 2. 1995, no. 4, pp. 353–362.

41   A. Bridge, ›Schengen Curtain‹ border controls rile east Europe, in: Independent, 29.3.1995, p. 3.

uncertainty.[42] The evidence does seem to support the notion that at present opportunities for making the East Slovakian borderland area a ›centre of attraction‹ are not very forthcoming.[43] The ›peripheral edge feature‹ still appears to be endemic in the Slovak political system; its dominant position will only fade if and when relations with bordering states improve. If the East Slovakian region is to function predominately as a centre of attraction, and therefore reverse any out-migration trends, the entire borderland needs to combine policies, especially at international level. Differences with neighbouring states over treatment of ethnic co-nationals, the fear of increasing unemployment, the urge to migrate westward and potential for becoming a future EU frontier (vis-a-vis the Ukraine), raise geographical problems for the East Slovakia region, not only at local, regional and national levels, but also on an international plane.[44]

The East Slovakian region, as part of the Slovak Republic, is making some headway in spite of the need for further efforts to build and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Such activity has to continue if the tide of out-migration is to be stemmed and the future of this borderland area is to achieve future success.

Conclusion

In the former Czechoslovakia, the transformation process has had a considerable impact on the development of future migration since the ending of communist rule in 1989. There was increasing migration movement across the new Czech/Slovak frontier, largely from east to west. This activity not only included tourists and traders, but also different types of migrants such as those pursuing job opportunities, seeking political or economic asylum, or merely transit migrants. Important state-related issues accompanying these changes have included modifications to domestic legislation, application for membership to international organisations and fluctuating links with neighbouring states.

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42 K.D. Martinsen, The Demise of Slovak Democracy?, mimeo (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute), Lyaker 1994.

43 A. Ivanicková, Niekolko pohladov na hodnotenie úrovne regionálneho rozvoja Slovenska, in: Ekonomický Casopis, 44. 1996, no. 3, pp. 212–228.

44 V. Krivý, Regióny Slovenska: východisková situácia a nedávny vývin, in: M. Bútora/P. Huncík (Nadácia Sándora Máraiho), Slovensko 1995: Súhrnná správa o stave spolecnosti, Bratislava 1996, pp. 257–273.

It still remains difficult to forecast future economic, political and social trends in the Czech and Slovak societies as both are still experiencing the early stages of market development.[45] The impact of regional differences on future migration therefore can only be predicted at a more general level through the identification of primary indicators. First, following separation, differences occurred in the intensity of development between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Secondly, political disruptions in some neighbouring states led to fears at home of dramatic changes in the sphere of international migration. Fortunately, such changes did not lead to the Czech and Slovak republics acting as countries of major transit migration particularly from East to West. However, the success of the Czech Republic continues to stimulate an increase in economic emigration from Slovakian territory.

All these factors could, in turn, lead to expected variations in the whole character of the migration process, involving questions of mobility, the role of net-migration, and extent of regional involvement. Over the next two decades it is fairly safe to assume that former Czechoslovakia will be subject to greater migrational movement than it ever experienced prior to 1989. Increasing population movement will result from an easing of the labour force, the gradual development of a private housing market, in spite of a short-term decline in building activity, and growing unemployment.[46] One may also assume there will be an expansion in the intensity of both permanent and temporary migration, as well as weekly and longer distance commuting. An increase particularly in the intensity of net-migration may emerge with greater economic competence in business enterprises, administrative districts and whole regions. Finally, it may be necessary to extend studies on migration frameworks in order to accommodate for any potential growth in metropolitan areas both at intermediate and macroregional levels.[47]

As mentioned above, migration patterns might reflect differences in regional economic development: Regions with outmoded heavy industry as well as rural

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45   V. Baláz, ›The Wild East‹? Capital Markets in the V4 countries, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 3. 1996, no. 3, pp. 251–266.

46   P. Koistinen, The search for national employment policies in Central and Eastern Europe, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 2. 1995, no. 1, pp. 41–54; Anon, PHARE Programme and contract information 1995: Slovakia, (European Commission) Brussels 1995; idem., Labour market development fund in Slovakia, Info PHARE, 11. 1996, pp. 6f.

47   M. Hampl/J. Müller, Geograficzne aspekty przemian spolecznych w Republice Czeskiej, Ch., in: F.W. Carter/W. Maik (eds.), Proces przeksztalcen spoleczno-gospodarczych w Europie Srodkowej i Wschodniej po roku 1989, Torun 1995, pp. 37–44.

regions presumably will suffer from rising unemployment, and consequently from out-migration whereas regions with extensive service sectors and a prosperous array of industrial activity, together with potential for the development of recreational facilities and international tourism, e.g. Prague and its metropolitan region, will prove a magnet for in-migration.

Information on the distribution of the regional unemployment pattern may be critical for this migration forecast; this factor at least partially indicates differences in socio-economic levels within administrative districts, producing pressures which can result in out-migration. Only time will tell whether such tensions will lead to a dominance of push over pull migration factors in either of the new republics.

In Slovakia, questions are emerging on whether its economic recovery is in trouble. The xenophobic rhetoric uttered by some Slovak political leaders is deterring outside interest and foreign investment has declined considerably.[48] A reversal of this situation is critical because, without foreign funds, a small state like Slovakia will have an uphill fight to achieve economic success. It lacks sufficient domestic capital to accomplish successful reforms and coupled with high unemployment figures, may increasingly encourage people to migrate. This would be especially so amongst members of those ethnic minority groups possessing a feeling of future insecurity. In such cases, movement will take place from those more economically backward districts of regions like East Slovakia, to wealthier urban centres or even abroad, probably in the Czech Republic, or perhaps farther afield.

It is therefore important for Slovakia to enjoy closer cooperation with other members of the Viségrad group, in order to ensure future progress.[49] Such a move is an essential entry qualification for its aspiring membership of the European Union, together with the infrastructural benefits of a unified Europe. It is to be hoped that such an entry will alleviate many of the inherent ethnic and socio-economic problems still to be found today in many parts of Slovakia's territory.

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[48]   R. Dobronsky/M. Landesmann, Transforming Economies and European Integration, London 1995.

[49]   F.W. Carter, Közép-Európa: valóság vagy földrajzi fikció?, in: Földrajzi Közlemények, 119 [43]. 1995, no. 3–4, pp. 232–250; M. Hübl, Cesi, Slováci a jejich sousedé, Naše vojsko, Prague 1991, p. 39.

In contrast, the Czech Republic, six years after its emergence into the brave new world of free-market capitalism, is now suffering from reform exhaustion. The state is widely accepted as a celebrity performer, given the number of reforms that have successfully appeared. Even so, many Czechs and members of the state's minority ethnic groups, are still asking why has there not been greater improvement in their quality of life, both economically and environmentally.

Current migratory trends in neighbouring states are also being observed closely by the Czech and Slovak republics, especially in frontier regions. The significance of such migration following the proposed eventual enlargement of the European Union to include the Viségrad Four states provides a key theme in future planning of European integration.[50]

Therefore the role of migration in former Czechoslovakia prior to and after the ›Velvet Divorce‹ had been examined. While the post-1989 political situation contributed substantially to a changing attitude towards the concept of identity among its multi-ethnic population, this feeling was further accentuated after the division of the country into two new independent republics in January 1993. Its impact on the migration scenario continues to unfold. For example, in Slovakia the latest information suggests that both immigration and emigration have declined in recent years. After the emergence of an independent Slovakia in 1993, more people came to the country than left it. In 1995, the surplus of immigration was about 2,900 people, half of them having come from the Czech Republic. Equally significant, in 1995, only 68,300 people left their permanent residence in Slovakia, a third less than in 1990 and nearly half (47.3%) fewer than in 1980.[51] The impact of the ›Velvet Divorce‹ is reflected in these figures which, in turn, impinges on the future development of both republics.

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50   Anon, Slovakia: The Viségrad three…, in: The Economist, 9.3.1996, pp. 45–46.

51   Anon, Composition and movement of Slovakia's population in 1995, in: TASR News Agency, Bratislava (4.1.1997; 19. 34 gmt), BBC Monitoring Service, London.

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